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

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

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
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
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


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
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
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


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
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

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WHO— WHAT— WHY—

INTER-ALLIED RELATIONS in Europe are a subject of constant interest for us. Here, **Henry A. Kissinger,** professor at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard, deals with the key country Germany, and the temptations put in its way by allied dissension and the frequent changes in American policy. Mr. Kissinger, whose article is adapted from his forthcoming book, *The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance,* to be published by McGraw-Hill, does not limit himself to criticism but suggests possible ways of tackling the explosive problem represented by the partition of Germany. . . . Italy is the Atlantic partner most neglected by political writers and most favored by artists. Indeed, Italian politics often appears even more difficult to understand than that of pre-Gaullist France. But, as **Claire Sterling** points out, recent trends in Italy are of considerable importance because that country may turn out once more to be the political pacesetter for other European nations.

NOT SO LONG AGO the situation in Laos seemed the most dismal in all Southeast Asia: the Communists and neutralists appeared to be in close alliance and controlled most of the country; a Communist takeover seemed only a matter of months; the government in Vientiane was in a state of collapse. When negotiation led to the 1962 Geneva Agreements, we lived up to our word and withdrew military support. Communists from neighboring countries—mostly Vietminh—stayed on, however, and gave every assistance to the Pathet Lao. Today, following a complex series of circumstances, things are better, but Laos is still not truly neutral and independent. Rather, as **Denis Warner** reports, there are two Laoses, one Communist, the other ably led by Souvanna Phouma and kept alive by the measure of success he is achieving and by discreet and effective U.S. support. . . . Consensus, currently the most overworked word in the lexicon of journalese, is usually a Johnsonian attribute. Thus we were fascinated to discover that Senator Dirksen, that doughty partisan campaigner, has become a rallying point for a mounting consensus in Congress in favor of circumventing the Supreme Court's one man, one vote reapportionment decisions. **Julius Duscha,** a national news reporter on the Washington *Post,* analyzes Dirksen's support on this issue, ranging from liberals to conservatives of both parties. . . . President Johnson, too, has been getting support from an unexpected quarter. In his daily scanning of the French press, **Edmond Taylor** has noted a growing if grudging respect both for LBJ the man and, indirectly, for his handling of the situation in Vietnam. . . . A few weeks ago we looked into the confusion that emanates from the Job Corps section of Sargent Shriver's Office of Economic Opportunity. The picture is brighter, **Hannah Lees** reports, in VISTA, the domestic Peace Corps, which is the smallest OEO project. The first volunteers have finished their training and are now in the field. Miss Lees is a free-lance writer who specializes in social welfare.

Leslie Paul's remarks on T. S. Eliot are excerpted from a BBC tribute to the poet last January. Mr. Paul, born in Dublin and educated in England, where he lives, is the author of many books, of which three are currently available in the United States: *The English Philosophers* (Hillary), *Sir Thomas More* (Roy), and *Nature into History* (Humanities). . . . **Andrew M. Greeley,** a Roman Catholic priest, is senior study director of the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. . . . **Frank Polite** teaches in the English Department of Youngstown University in Ohio. . . . Our Chilean commentator is inspired by the season. . . . **Albert C. Schmidt** lives in Paris and is at work on a book about Romanesque ruins. . . . In 1955 an unusual film called *Marty* won an Academy Award and that of the New York Film Critics. **Paddy Chayefsky,** who wrote and helped to produce it, numbers among his most recent published works *The Tenth Man, Gideon,* and *The Passion of Joseph D.* (all Random House), as well as the screenplay *The Americanization of Emily.* . . . **John S. Saloma III** is assistant professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and president of the Ripon Society. . . . **Kenneth S. Lynn,** professor of English at Harvard, has just edited, in association with the editors of *Daedalus, The Professions in America* (Houghton Mifflin); among his other works is *Mark Twain and Southwestern Humor* (Atlantic Monthly Press).

Our cover for this issue, the face of West Germany, is by **Johannes Regn.**

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Acrostician—

CHARLES CHAPLIN

CORRESPONDENCE

WEIGHING THE RISK

To the Editor: One hopes these days to be able to give President Johnson the benefit of one's doubts, even when it seems at times that the President is not willing to do the same for his critics. So I was gratified to read your sympathetic but not uncritical account of our President's plight over Vietnam (the editorial "Back Home," *The Reporter*, March 25). I must respectfully submit, however, that "escalation" is more than a "new shibboleth"; it is an eminently undesirable result of any military action, a result whose likelihood must be weighed along with the necessities that may impel action. No doubt the President has acted "knowing the risk"; one can only pray he has also weighed it, finding U.S. interests of commensurate gravity to place on the other side of the scale.

One also hopes to be able to form an intelligent opinion on our nation's involvement in Southeast Asia, even when it seems that events will follow the same course irrespective of the quality of our opinions. So I was also gratified to read Denis Warner's incisive review of the events leading up to the present bombing raids in the North ("Three Afro-Asian Fronts: I. Vietnam," March 25). History will probably judge our action by its degree of success, or, more charitably, by whether there were rational grounds for believing success would result. It has seemed to me that for our actions to make sense, two conditions must prevail: (1) sufficient political control by Hanoi of the Vietcong to give it the power to halt or curb the guerrilla activity in the South; (2) enough meaningful aid from Hanoi to the Vietcong that, were it stopped, the guerrillas would be so weakened that they could be defeated or controlled. These are questions of fact. One assumes that the administration has hard intelligence which lends support to its recent accusations of Hanoi. My hope is that the press in general, and *The Reporter* in particular, can present enough of these facts—if such facts exist—to put to rest the doubts of those of us who are finding it increasingly difficult to support our President's announced course.

JAY GASKILL
Oakland, California

JOB CORPS PROGRESS

To the Editor: Barbara Carter's "Can the Job Corps Do the Job?" (*The Reporter*, March 25) was well done, and while we may cringe a little at the picture painted of total chaos, we have no complaints as to accuracy.

However, many of the problems of the Job Corps have been straightened out, and the first eleven youths from New York City were selected last week. Their individual histories were pathetic and so clearly identify the great potential of the Job Corps. We have a contract for eighty youths on this first assignment for March.

In addition, the Neighborhood Youth Corps is well on its way. Satisfactory agreements were reached with the state officials in time to meet our March 1 deadline, and progress is evident. Our major application has been submitted. So despite some of the complaints of a slow start, we feel rather proud of the hurdles we've cleared in our first five months.

ANNE M. ROBERTS
Staff Director
Anti Poverty Operations Board
New York

POPULATION PLANNING

To the Editor: Ben J. Wattenberg and Richard M. Scammon are no doubt correct in "Our Population: The Statistics Explosion" (*The Reporter*, March 25) when they state that the fertility of United States families will adapt itself to the prevailing economic and social circumstances, and that America could feed one billion persons. It is, of course, a question that must be answered by the unborn generations.

However, I am concerned about the authors' failure to seriously consider the future effects of population expansion in the underdeveloped nations of the world upon the United States and the other developed countries. They note, in passing, that "there is surely cause for concern in other parts of the world" and that the fertility rate is not a "fixed thing that goes unchecked with no relation to the outside world," but they do not acknowledge how immensely important this outside world is for the internal conditions of life and indirectly for the marital behavior and birth rate in countries like the United States.

These effects were among the matters discussed at the recent meeting in New York of the United Nations Population Commission, to which I was the Swedish delegate. Using a system of high, low, and medium rate variants and not the straight-line birth-rate projections ridiculed by Wattenberg and Scammon, a group of demographers from eighteen participating nations came to the rather plausible conclusion that the world's population would double by the year 2,000 to about six billion people. But this substantially reduced prediction is based on the assumption that the less developed regions will begin reducing their birth rates with the help and influence of the one-third of the world population that is already practicing family planning.

We know that an average of twenty-five per cent of the population of underdeveloped countries are children under five years old, of which seventy per cent die from undernourishment. Out of the surviving thirty per cent will come the new shapers of nations and events on whom the peace of the world will depend. Without the rapid introduction of family planning and child

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spacing in these countries, severe social and political conflicts will be unavoidable. And we Americans and Swedes can unconsciously be digging "a national grave" for ourselves, not by allowing "large crops of babies" in our own countries but by perpetuating an attitude of indifference and ignorance toward the "large crop of babies" in other countries, despite the tragic harvests of death among them.

ULLA LINDSTROM
The Swedish Mission
to the United Nations
New York

To the Editor: The Wattenberg-Scammon article is a valuable contribution to the population dialogue, but it is incomplete. The major reason for consideration of population planning in the United States is unemployment. Automation has slowed the rate of increase of job opportunities. The labor force continues to grow, not only because of our still high birth rate but also because jobs are increasingly sought by women and Negroes. For full employment, leaving aside all consideration of how many people are optimal ultimately in the United States, job opportunities and the labor force (as determined by the birth rate) must increase at similar rates. But population planning for the United States has received almost no attention from any significant group in the American power structure.

DR. ALAN F. HOFMANN,
The Rockefeller Institute
New York

VIVE LA DIFFERENCE

To the Editor: The ideology of the American "melting pot" dies hard, but Ralph Ellison and Robert Penn Warren have struck it another blow in their dialogue (*The Reporter*, March 25), and it's good that they've done so.

Far too many well-intentioned whites display the unconscious biases of their race and social class by supporting civil rights and related actions, so that the Negro can be "just like us." This is insufferable because it dismisses the experiences and values of millions of black Americans as being without intrinsic worth, or honors them only as "contributions" (how exacted and on what terms?).

Each of us experiences his own worth (and the worth of others) only from within the rich particularity of a cultural enclave whose dimensions, qualities, and meanings are deeply felt if not always clearly articulated. Our shames and our glories alike are not ours alone, but inescapably also those of the collectivities, large and small, which give us sustenance.

The Negro surely can enter fully into the life of America only as a Negro. Whatever the outcome of his struggles, he will enrich our lives, as whites, in proportion to the delight we take in his not being "just like us."

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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THE REPORTER'S NOTES

The President On Southeast Asia

Who can ever say again that this magician in domestic politics, Lyndon Johnson, is ill equipped in dealing with foreign affairs? With a single master stroke he has dispelled this notion. His speech on Vietnam, which was called definitive by the newspapers even before it was delivered, is the supreme evidence of the President's capacity for arousing consent among men of hitherto different opinions. This the President did on the most divisive issue facing America.

How did he do it? How could the same speech be praised for inspirational moralism and for craftiness? How could it be hailed as the expression of what men of entirely contrasting views and aims now modestly admit to have advocated all along? The creation of such instant confusion requires a formidable talent. Again, let's say it: Lyndon Johnson proved to be at least as good in tackling diplomatic issues for domestic and foreign consumption as he has been in the handling of Congress.

We would like to join the chorus, but we have reservations that we cannot leave unsaid. As has happened on other occasions, the President overdid it. There is an outsize character in this man and in his achievements. He offered at least five reasons to explain why we are in South Vietnam, ranging all the way from universal generalities to a specific and compelling one: "The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied." A case is weakened when it is justified by a plurality of assorted arguments.

At times, the President's sense of reality is superb: ". . . we must deal with the world as it is, if it is ever to be as we wish." This is pure Machiavelli, or pure de Gaulle. He is firm in expressing his readiness for "unconditional discussions." But after having stated as a preliminary condition that discussions must be with the governments concerned, not with a would-be government like the Vietcong, he just as firmly declares that "We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement." He knows it takes two to make peace.

Unfortunately, there is a curious imbalance between the first part of his speech, where on the whole he shows a sense of reality and of our aims, and the second, where he soars into a kind of Messianism. This part opens with the sentence: "This war, like most wars, is filled with terrible irony." The word "irony" is characteristic of certain schools of theological thinking which use it as a kindly synonym for sinful contradiction. In this case the "irony" is in the fact that all peoples everywhere, irrespective of the ideologies that divide their governments, are united in wanting food and clothes and education. America, in the President's mind, has a very large role to play in helping to feed and clothe "the needy in Asia." This is quite an undertaking, and one wonders whether the war on poverty that this latter-day international Populist from Texas wants to launch over Asia isn't well beyond the resources of our nation, surpluses included.

Our country could substantially contribute to the job if we had complete disarmament, and it is on this subject that the President reaches the highest peak of Messianism. After having deplored several times the role that weapons still play, he says that "The guns and the bombs, the rockets and the warships, are all symbols of human failure." How must Secretary McNamara feel, considering that these symbols of failure, of which he is the assiduous caretaker, are costing the nation about fifty billions a year? The

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President adds that "They are necessary symbols." Some of them serve their purpose now in Vietnam, where we are facing an enemy who, as the President said in the first part of his speech, cannot be appeased by a withdrawal or a phony peace.

From our President, the nation has the right to expect the guidance we need for the defense of our interests and ideas. This guidance, so far, Lyndon Johnson has been giving with singular adroitness. But to the pledges he will live up to, he can well avoid trying to add the coming of the Kingdom of God on this earth.

—MAX ASCOLI

HUAC versus the Klan

Shortly after the news came over the ticker in the House cloakroom that the President would welcome a Congressional investigation of the Ku Klux Klan, a group of newsmen gathered around Representative Edwin E. Willis (D., Louisiana), chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Since early February the committee had been weighing the possibility of just such an investigation, and although Willis was not prepared to give a final answer at his impromptu press conference, it was apparent to a few congressmen who stood at the edge of the group that he was eager to get on with it and that time was running out on any opportunity to wrest the inquiry from his committee. Accordingly, a few alarmed congressmen made hasty if singularly unsuccessful efforts to interest Emanuel Celler (D., New York) in claiming jurisdiction for the House Judiciary Committee. Reportedly, Chairman Celler felt that his own committee was too busy with civil-rights legislation. In the absence of any effective opposition, the committee voted 9-0 to have at it. Willis has now asked an additional $50,000 for the inquiry which, whatever its effect may be upon the Ku Klux Klan, is expected to give his committee a new lease on life.

It does not take a particularly profound sense of history to see the elements of danger in the situation: the wholesale indictment of a group for the acts of individuals, the confusion of ideology (such as it is)

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with specific violations of criminal statutes, the muddying of the distinction between advocacy and conspiracy. All this is old hat to the committee, but in recent years it has found expression in some unexpected quarters—from the theorists of a generalized guilt for the Dallas tragedy with their calls for punishment of hate groups, to the liberal Republican formulators last summer of an indefinable crime called "extremism." This current widespread imprecision only compounds the hazards of the Klan's being investigated by a congressional committee whose techniques of "exposure" have traditionally come close to being acts of attainder and whose mandate both as to the meaning of "Un-American" and of "Activities" has always been perilously vague. Fifteen years of struggling in the courts with the Communist party have proved how particular the Constitution can be when it comes to legislation against the membership of any group as a whole. What the Justice Department now has in mind is to enlarge its authority to move in where there is evidence of conspiracy to deprive an individual of his rights and to stiffen the penalties. That these laws could use some amending has been made apparent by the dismissal of indictments brought under them in two of the most notorious murder cases in the South, that of Lemuel Penn in Georgia and that of the three young civil-rights workers in Mississippi.

Meanwhile, and somewhat inscrutably, the staff of the Un-American Activities Committee is going about its preparatory business. It is said that certain members of the committee have been unable to find out much about the doings of that staff, which has a life of its own and which outnumbers committee members by one of the highest ratios—more than five to one—of any committee staff on the Hill. There has been a good amount of speculation that the committee might use the inquiry as a preliminary rite of absolution before moving into the area of Communist infiltration of the civil-rights movement and also use it to lay the groundwork—with liberal acquiescence—for highly objectionable and expandable legislation in the future. "You have what might be a partial subversion," Committee Counsel Alfred M. Nittle told us recently in the course of explaining how the Klan might qualify as an Un-American entity posing a threat to the Federal government.

Recently, a letter has been circulated in the House by Don Edwards (D., California) in an attempt to get signatures in support of a call to refer the investigation to the Judiciary Committee. It hasn't gotten very far, and more's the pity: one of the imperatives of the current civil-rights crisis is that scrupulous attention be paid to infringements of Constitutional rights and the self-defeating precedents that may be set in an effort to right old wrongs and to punish particularly hideous crimes. It is a problem no less serious for being a little unpopular to talk about these days, and we are hard put to think of any group less qualified by its past practices and its continuing objectives to deal with it properly than the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

If a Million Die . . .

Red China, whose agents have been fomenting revolutionary disorder for some time throughout Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, appears to have opened up a new and particularly fertile field for troublemaking: the Middle East. Peking's immediate aim in the area, according to French sources who follow its affairs closely, is not so much to infiltrate the Arab governments—though of course it never passes up a chance to do so—as simply to inflame the already dangerous international or interracial conflicts that make the region the nuclear-age equivalent of the pre-1914 Balkan powder keg.

One conflict in which the Chinese have been showing considerable interest recently is the nearly three-year-old war in Yemen, where the pro-Egyptian puppet régime in Sana has been steadily losing ground to the royalist guerrillas. Peking has nothing against royalists as such any more than it has against Congolese cannibals or fetichists, but for reasons of its own it has decided in this case to back the

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"progressive" camp in Sana. The reason is simple: the Yemen war has been undermining the Egyptian economy, and Nasser has recently been reported anxious to withdraw his forces from Yemen, which would automatically bring the war to an end. According to the independent left-wing Parisian newsletter *Evénements et Perspectives*, which is often well informed on Arab affairs, Peking has offered to send arms and instructors to replace Nasser's. The offer wasn't made officially to the Sana government but through the left-wing labor leader Abdullah al Asnag, head of the Aden Trades Union Congress, who has visited China several times, with the suggestion that if it wasn't accepted, he take over the government with Chinese help.

Even more ominous, according to French sources, is Peking's sponsorship of the extremist "liberation front" of the Palestinian refugees in the Middle East. A delegation of the front headed by Ahmed Choukairy was recently invited to China, where it was offered arms, financial support, and technical instruction for expanded guerrilla warfare against Israel. *Evénements et Perspectives* claims that even the present pro-Nasserist leadership of the organization—which already frightens responsible Arab leaders by its violence—is considered too tepid for Peking's purposes and that while publicly feting Choukairy, the Chinese have been intriguing with members of the delegation to eliminate him in favor of a more "revolutionary" chief.

Judging from a speech delivered by Mao to the delegation, the anti-Israel passion of the Palestinian refugees and their Egyptian backers is being inhibited by what the Chinese consider bourgeois humanitarianism, or at least preoccupation with survival. "An Algerian delegation told us once," Mao related to Choukairy, according to a UPI dispatch in *Le Monde*, "that Algeria had lost a million lives in the struggle for independence. I told them that peoples shouldn't be frightened if their population decreases in the course of a liberation war, for they will enjoy a period of peace afterwards in which they can multiply again."

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

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The Price of German Unity

HENRY A. KISSINGER

THE STATUS of Germany has been the key to the stability of Europe for at least three centuries. In the twentieth century, the peace of Europe has been violated twice by a powerful and unified Germany. But prior to 1871, when Germany was composed of a group of competing states, it was the arena of conflict for other European powers that sought to perpetuate its divisions, thwart its national aspirations, and prevent one another from gaining a preponderant influence.

Considering this history, it was inevitable that Germany, when it was finally unified in 1871, should identify security with sufficient strength to defend itself against all of its neighbors simultaneously. But this effort, however understandable, proved fatal to the stability of Europe. Germany's strength, coupled with its central position, produced a vicious circle. A country powerful enough to defend itself against *all* its neighbors simultaneously would also be strong enough to defeat each of them singly. Moreover, the effort to develop such strength required a mobilization of resources and an exaltation of national feelings certain to disquiet all other European countries. Bismarck, who unified Germany, spoke of "the nightmare of hostile coalitions." It was Germany's tragedy that the effort to prevent these coalitions made them inevitable. Germany has been either too weak or too powerful for the peace of Europe.

One of the major challenges of western policy since the end of the war has been to integrate Germany into the community of nations in a manner consistent both with its legitimate national aspirations and with international stability. A number of farsighted American and European statesmen sought to bring about a new political structure based on the proposition that if Germany was to play a constructive international role it must have a stake in something larger than itself. This is why German postwar leaders have been among the strongest advocates of European political union and Atlantic co-operation.

They have felt the need for larger structures all the more keenly because they realize that Germany as a national state has suffered too many breaks in historical continuity and too many shocks. Every German above the age of fifty has lived through three revolutions. He has known four different régimes, each claiming to be morally antithetical to its predecessor. He has seen Germany lose two world wars and has experienced two catastrophic inflations. Every German above thirty-five has witnessed the trauma of the Nazi period, of World War II, and of the postwar collapse. Rootlessness and loss of territorial integrity contribute to the insecurity of German leadership groups, the stridency and legalism of whose disputes often hide a lack of inward assurance. In short,

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Germany is too exposed geographically and too vulnerable psychologically to sustain a very active autonomous policy.

The effort to integrate Germany into a larger community would have been delicate in the best of circumstances. In recent years it has become stalled because of the Franco-American conflict over the future of the Atlantic Alliance. Each of the protagonists has sought to add Germany to its side: France by claiming to be a better spokesman for German and European concerns than America; the United States by advocating schemes for nuclear control—especially the so-called Multilateral Force (MLF).

These conflicting pressures have placed the Federal Republic in an extremely uncomfortable position. Germany, though courted on all sides, runs the risk of finding itself isolated. Every gesture by the Federal Republic toward either France or the United States evokes so much pressure from the other that a compensatory move must then be made. In order to assuage American outrage over the Franco-German treaty of collaboration, Chancellor Adenauer agreed in principle to the MLF. When the negotiations over the MLF threatened a Franco-German rift, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard felt obliged to recement Franco-German ties. Because of its understandable insecurities, Germany requires, above all, a calm and steady senior partner. The frequent changes in American policy on strategic doctrine, nuclear control, and the emphasis to be given to various partners threaten to undermine the stability of German political life, whatever the merit of individual United States positions. French policy has been consistent but it has confronted the Federal Republic with choices it is unprepared to make. As a result, the pro-western elements in Germany are in danger of splitting into pro-American and pro-French factions. Over a period of time, the beneficiaries must be the nationalists or the quasi-neutralists. Thrown on its own resources by the rivalry between France and the United States, the Federal Republic has been forced to become increasingly conscious of its own unfulfilled national aspirations.

These competing pressures threaten to upset the delicate balance on which Germany's integration into the Atlantic Alliance was built. Germany has emerged as the balance wheel of the alliance. The most exposed western ally, seventeen million of whose people are Communist hostages, has become the focal point of all disputes. Its internal structure may not be equal to this strain. There are signs already that the conflict may tear apart the governing party, the Christian Democratic

Union, which largely forged the pro-western orientation of the Federal Republic. This will liberate tendencies that are now restrained by the desire to maintain the appearance of preserving a well-established consensus. France, in turn, seeing that the Franco-German treaty, by which it has sought to limit the Federal Republic's freedom of action, has had the practical consequence of enhancing Germany's national role, may be tempted to seek reinsurance by improving its relations in Eastern Europe.

Thus the current situation contains a series of time bombs. The combination of de Gaulle's abruptness and America's shortsighted reaction to it threatens to bring about what each of the rivals should fear most: a Germany increasingly absorbed in its own unfulfilled national aims and aware of the bargaining position conferred on it by its central position and growing power.

German Unity and Atlantic Policy

The most serious potential source of conflict between the Federal Republic and its allies—and the lever with which the Communist countries may hope to pry Germany loose from its Atlantic ties—is the division of Germany. No German political leader can accept as permanent the subjugation of seventeen million of his compatriots by Soviet arms—all German political parties are agreed on this point. Furthermore, there is clear evidence that the desire for unification is on the rise. If the alliance seems indifferent to the division of Germany, German leaders will be under increasing pressure to seek it bilaterally—a course which raises the danger of nationalism or neutralism or both.

The problem is complicated by three factors:

¶ NATO is an alliance of status quo countries; yet one of its principal members seeks a basic change in the status quo.

¶ None of Germany's allies share its national aspirations with equal intensity.

¶ Germany's past has left a legacy of distrust that creates special obstacles to its international role.

These difficulties become particularly severe whenever there appears to be some relaxation in East-West tensions. To most of the members of NATO, détente comes as a welcome respite. To the Federal Republic, it implies the danger of a tacit acceptance of the status quo. Most of the allies do not find the division of Germany intolerable, whereas the Federal Republic considers acceptance of the present dividing line in Central Europe a sacrifice of basic national aspirations.

For the first fifteen years of NATO's existence, this difference was obscured by the formula that the division of Germany was one of the causes of the cold war and that a relaxation of tensions presupposed

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progress toward unification. In the meantime, it has become apparent that there are powerful, perhaps dominant, tendencies in the West to consider a détente even if German unification should not thereby be advanced—or else to assert that the only road to German unification is through promoting a relaxation of tensions.

American policy on Germany reflects these trends. It seems to contain the following elements: to defend the freedom of West Berlin, including free access to that city; to attempt to tie Germany closely to the United States through institutions such as the Multilateral Force and by other arrangements such as arms purchases; to assert periodically its interest in German unification without, however, pressing the issue sufficiently hard to endanger the possibilities of a détente with the Soviet Union or to throw down an open challenge to the East German satellite; and to encourage the Federal Republic to pursue a more active policy in Eastern Europe and even toward the East German satellite.

ENCOURAGING a more active German policy toward the East is especially favored by many leaders in Washington and London. They are convinced that increased contacts between the two Germanys will promote the erosion of the East German régime. According to this school of thought, in any increased contact between the two Germanys the superior cohesiveness and strength of the Federal Republic will give it by far the stronger bargaining position. At a minimum, such negotiations may make life more bearable for the East German population.

Such reasoning has caused western proposals for reunification gradually to move toward enhancing the status of the East German régime. In 1955, the western plan still called for unification through free elections. In 1959, a new plan called for a technical commission composed of twenty-five West and ten East Germans to engage in preliminary negotiations for a year. Decisions were to be taken by a majority of three-fourths, giving East Germany an effective veto. In the proposals of 1962, the composition of these commissions had become equal and the time limit of one year had been removed. Also in 1962, the allies proposed an International Access Authority to Berlin, in which the East German régime was given equal status with the Federal Republic.

The preferences of its allies have in recent years found support even in the Federal Republic. The West



German government has reluctantly accepted the principles of technical commissions in which East and West Germany would enjoy parity. Others argue that contacts between the two Germanys will carry the "bacillus of freedom" into the East and thus "infect" the East German satellite with western values.

The Hostages

But any such policy must sharply distinguish three sets of relationships: western attitudes toward East Germany, toward the East European countries, and toward the Soviet Union. If the West pursues a united policy, there is considerable merit in a more flexible stance toward the countries of Eastern Europe. The purpose must be, however, to isolate the East German satellite; therefore, enhancing the status of East Germany is a dangerous course. In any direct negotiations between the two German states, the bargaining position of the Federal Republic would be precarious. In all such contacts, humanitarian concerns would outweigh political considerations. Germany's allies should not contribute to the already considerable confusion among three partly incompatible objectives: improvement of conditions in East Germany, consolidation of the East German régime, and progress toward German unification.

Ameliorating conditions in East Germany, however desirable for humanitarian reasons, is likely to help the East German régime consolidate itself and thus make unification more remote except on East German terms. As the respectability of the East German régime grew, the moral cost to the Soviets of maintaining the division of Germany would be diminished. The impact of a more benevolent régime in the Soviet Zone on the Federal Republic could be extremely corrosive. The freedom of Berlin would grow more and more precarious as East Germany approaches the character of a sovereign state.

This process is likely to be gradual. While the East German régime is striving to establish its international status, its demands may be moderate. But once it is recognized —or even if its international status is substantially enhanced—it will have major incentives to seek to undermine the Federal Republic. National feelings in East Germany, unlike those in Eastern Europe, are hostile to the existing government. In Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, patriotism can lead to the conclusion that the national interest is best served by liberalizing the existing governments because no focus for alternative loyalties exists. In East Germany, by contrast, national aspirations clash with the existence of a Communist régime. A prosperous, democratic West Germany acts as a powerful magnet. Thus the East German régime has every incentive to seek to weaken the Federal Republic. It can use its own population as a hostage and the exposed position of Berlin as a lever.

THE SUPERIORITY OF West Germany's bargaining position—which is postulated by some American policymakers—may, therefore, be an illusion. On the contrary, German political leaders may find themselves facing a growing dilemma. In return for easing the fate of their population or tolerating access to Berlin, the East Germans can demand concrete political gains. Confronted by popular pressures and moved by humanitarian impulses,

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no German government will find it easy to be dispassionate in deciding at what point an accumulation of seemingly marginal concessions has produced an irreversible trend. In turn, every West German concession to the German Democratic Republic will strengthen those in the allied countries who favor recognition of that satellite régime in any event. The result is more likely to be the indefinite continuation of two hostile, competing German states than progress toward unification.

To be sure, if German political leaders are determined to pursue this course, there is nothing we can do to prevent it. But we should make certain that the West cannot be blamed for the probable consequences. And we should do nothing to promote policies that may lead to a growing demoralization of the Federal Republic. The Opening to the Left in Italy has undermined the Center and opened the way to respectability for the Communists. Much more dangerous results could follow in Germany from a policy of enhancing the status of the East German régime.

The Prospects for German Unity

The dilemma posed by the German quest for unity can be summed up as follows: unification must be a primary goal of any German government, but pursued as a national policy, unification is impossible and disruptive of European and Atlantic cohesion. At the same time, no serious effort to further German unity in any other framework has been undertaken for a decade. If these policies are not brought into harmony, a crisis in the relations of the Federal Republic toward its allies is probable.

A concrete allied program for German unity is essential also to overcome the predicament in which the alliance now finds itself: Many in the West argue that German unification cannot be the prerequisite of a relaxation of tensions; the contrary is said to be the only realistic course. German leaders, on the other hand, have a more complex attitude. They make a distinction between "peripheral" settlements, which they welcome, and "central" agreements, which they oppose unless they bring some progress on the German question. They are uneasy lest the German situation become frozen as the consequence of a general détente.

Finally, a concrete program for German unity is necessary to prevent the gradual, almost imperceptible acceptance of the Soviet framework for German unity: that it be negotiated directly by the two German states—a scheme which while incapable of promoting unification is well designed to foster both nationalism and neutralism.

For these reasons Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder's proposal at the NATO ministers' conference of



May and December, 1964, that the United States, Great Britain, and France make new diplomatic overtures on behalf of German unification, deserved a more positive response than it received. To be sure, the western allies were probably correct in their view that any proposal acceptable to the Federal Republic would not prove negotiable with the Soviet Union. But negotiability is only one criterion for diplomacy and not always the decisive one. Otherwise, the agenda of any conference would be determined by the Soviets. On the issue of Germany in particular, one purpose of allied negotiations should be to demonstrate that if no progress toward unification is made, the onus rests on the U.S.S.R.

While the allies should show greater understanding for the anguish of a divided country, the Federal Republic has to face the fact that German unity can become an active policy only if it is embodied in a concrete program. Heretofore Bonn has demanded support for German unification, but it has recoiled from encouraging a specific plan to achieve it. It has feared that any proposal might involve provisions about Germany's frontiers and about limitations on German arms that would amount to unilateral concessions.

But any serious proposal on German unification must have at least two components: it must settle Germany's eastern frontier with Poland and Czechoslovakia along existing dividing lines, and it must establish a system of arms control for Central Europe.

NO PLAN on German unity can avoid a consideration of the difficult and sensitive problem of Germany's frontiers. This tragic issue has its origin in 1945, when the Potsdam Agreement placed the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, which had been German for centuries, under Polish administration pending a final settlement in a peace treaty. Poland then expelled the approximately ten million Germans living there and replaced them with Polish settlers, mostly from Polish territories taken over by the Soviet Union. The Federal Republic has refused to accept the Oder-Neisse line as final. This is partly to retain a bargaining lever for an eventual peace conference, partly because of the pressure of the refugees from the disputed territories, most of whom now live in the Federal Republic.

The problem posed by the Oder-Neisse line is one of the human tragedies of our time. The reluctance of the Federal Republic to renounce territories that had been German for centuries is understandable. Moreover, there is something cynical about the insistent East European demand that the Federal Republic accept the eastern frontier of the East German satellite régime, which

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in turn is recognized by all East European countries.

Nevertheless, the perpetuation of German claims to the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line complicates progress on the issue of unification. It provides the Soviets with a convenient excuse for maintaining their hold on East Germany, and it cements Soviet relations with Eastern Europe. Reluctance to cede a claim to territories that no longer contain any German settlers contributes to perpetuating foreign rule over seventeen million Germans between the Elbe and the Oder-Neisse line.

To be sure, it is an important tactical question at what point the Federal Republic should renounce its claims. But it is essential to recognize that acceptance by Germany of its eastern frontiers will have to be part of any responsible program for unification.

A New Approach

Heretofore western plans on unification have been thwarted by three overriding Soviet motives for keeping Germany divided: the desire to preserve a Communist government; the wish to preserve East Germany's economic capacity for the Soviet bloc; and the attempt to ensure Soviet security by preventing a unified Germany from pressing on Eastern Europe.

A new western approach to the issue of German unification should attempt to separate these various issues. Without going into all the details, one possible course could be to separate the issue of self-determination from that of unification for an interim period, say fifteen years. Pressure for immediate unification consolidates all opponents of Germany in Eastern Europe and *sub rosa* in Western Europe as well. Self-determination, on the other hand, is a moral imperative commanding wide consensus. If rejected by the Communists, it would place them at least morally on the defensive.

Such a proposal could take the following form: the western countries, including the Federal Republic, could announce that, while the unification of Germany remains the ultimate goal, the immediate aim is to enable the population of East Germany to choose the form of government it prefers. The western allies could, therefore, declare their willingness to acquiesce in the temporary existence of an East German state, provided its government emerges from a process of free elections, and provided it is explicitly established as an intermediate stage toward unification. For a period

of fifteen years the territory now called the German Democratic Republic would have a status similar to that of present-day Austria. A loose confederation could be established between the two German states, but East Germany would be independent, neutral, and demilitarized. For a period of ten years, the existing economic obligations of the present German Democratic Republic to the East European countries, including the Soviet Union, could be maintained. After that period, these links would depend on normal negotiations with the government then in office in East Germany.

A COMMISSION composed of European neutrals—Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, and perhaps Finland—would monitor the free elections and the demilitarization provisions of the treaty. Soviet troops would be withdrawn from East Germany prior to the elections. After a period of fifteen years, there would be a plebiscite supervised by the same commission to determine whether East Germany wanted to continue in loose confederation with the Federal Republic or whether it preferred unification on a federal basis. In either case, East Germany would remain demilitarized. Both German states would recognize the existing frontiers of Germany, including the Oder-Neisse line. After the neutral commission certified that the government of East Germany was freely elected, Berlin could become the capital of that state as well as the seat of the organs of the German confederation. No further reason to maintain Berlin as a separate political entity would exist. Within the Federal Republic, foreign troops would retire a distance roughly equal to that between the Elbe and the Oder-Neisse. The Federal Republic would renounce access to the ownership of nuclear weapons.

Even if there were agreement in principle, many details would remain to be worked out: for example, the precise definition of demilitarization or what international undertakings would be consistent with the neutral status of the new state. But once the direction of an "Austrian" solution for East Germany were taken, the advantages would be plain: a terminal date to the division of Germany would be established. The process of incorporating more and more features of Soviet proposals in western plans would be reversed. A foreign-backed régime detested by the population would be removed. The East European states would gain the security of a belt of controlled armaments along their borders for the indefinite future. The East European economies could adjust to the loss of their East German partner over a ten-year period. The Berlin problem would be solved. Germany's frontiers would be settled both juridically and psychologically because the generation that was expelled from Eastern Europe would have largely disappeared by the time Germany was unified. Arms-control schemes for Europe could be linked to a specific program for unification. In the fifteen years before the plebiscite that would settle the unity of Germany, European political integration could be fostered in order to reduce the fear of any one national state.

Such a program would end a situation that is bound to become more and more dangerous. Even if such a program were to be rejected initial-

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ly by the Soviets, it would change the framework of negotiations. Rather than begin with enhancing the status of the East German régime, as is the case with current schemes, the new program would focus attention on its oppressiveness as the principal obstacle to unification. This would arrest the present drift toward a gradual enhancement of the East German régime. By taking a stand on the issue of self-determination, the West would have a platform most likely to command international support. By separating self-determination from unification, an interim period for adjustments and a framework for meeting legitimate security concerns of Germany's neighbors would be provided.

Possible Alternatives

Still, it is highly improbable that any negotiating formula will advance German unity. Even the most reasonable program is likely to be rejected by the East. Thus the West requires two interim policies: (a) with respect to Eastern Europe and (b) with respect to its own internal arrangements.

With respect to Eastern Europe, the policy should be to give incentives for autonomous foreign policies and to differentiate, whenever it is possible, between East European governments and the East German satellite. The purpose should be to isolate the East German satellite and to convince the countries of Eastern Europe that maintaining the division of Germany is not necessary for their security. The Federal Republic could contribute by modifying some of the rigidities of the Hallstein Doctrine, by which it refuses to maintain diplomatic relations with any country that recognizes the East German régime. The isolation of that satellite can, under present circumstances, be furthered best by seeking to reduce the fear of Germany in Eastern Europe. One possible adaptation of the Hallstein Doctrine would be for the Federal Republic to establish diplomatic relations with all of Germany's neighbors, thus opening direct contact with Poland and Czechoslovakia.

BUT THE long-term prospects of Germany do not depend on such tactical considerations. What is needed is a willingness by the West to embark on two related courses: (1) to recognize the psychological and political dilemmas of a divided country and (2) to make Germany part of a larger community. The first policy requires, above all, steadiness and reliability on the part of Germany's allies—especially its strongest partner, the United States. They must take care not to overstrain the fabric of German political life by a restless and constantly shifting search for ever-new expedients or by trying to use the Federal Republic as a weight against each other or by urging the Federal Republic into assuming extra-European risks, thus exposing the most vulnerable country to the grave danger of blackmail (witness the German imbroglio in the Middle East). The most useful policy for the United States toward the Federal Republic is to forge ties at all levels that assure Germany of the moral and political backing of a senior partner.

But bilateral policies cannot solve the problem of Germany. To pretend that there is a "European" solution is to remove the weight in the scales—the United States—on which the security of Europe ultimately rests. To stimulate German distrust of France is to foster the traditional forms of nationalism. Nevertheless, this is what has been happening. The practical result of the Franco-American rivalry is that each ally is tempted to bring the Federal Republic to its side by holding out vague hopes and grandiose schemes. German leaders are torn by the conflicting demands of their allies and their own national aspirations. The West, which has so often been rent by internal struggles, stands in danger of repeating its historic folly. Paris may have thought that by committing the Federal Republic to a treaty of special friendship it was discouraging temptations of nationalism and providing for the construction of Europe. Washington's attitude toward the Franco-German treaty was motivated by a desire to combat third-force tendencies. These competing efforts stand in danger of producing what they seek to prevent; the attempt to use Germany as a balance wheel will complete the fragmentation of the Atlantic Alliance.

The long-term hope for German unity resides in an evolution in the West that will act as a magnet for the countries of Eastern Europe. As Western Europe achieves political unity, the fear of any one state will diminish. A united Europe, moreover, will be a powerful magnet for the countries of Eastern Europe. As ties between the two parts of Europe grow, the East German satellite could increasingly appear as a vestige of a passing era.

THIS united Europe, in turn, should be part of a close and confident Atlantic relationship. A farsighted western policy will therefore seek to convert the so-called German problem into an effort to build structures, European and Atlantic, in which the Federal Republic can participate as a respected and equal member. The challenge is to overcome the struggles for prestige and influence which form the headlines of today and to channel energies into the construction of a larger community.



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

Italy's Catholic-Communist Dialogue

CLAIRE STERLING

ROME

HAVING RUN THROUGH two cabinets during their first unhappy year together, Premier Aldo Moro and his partners of the Center and Left have just started on a third. The new cabinet, formed after a winter of serpentine negotiations, is barely distinguishable from the others and may be unable to hold out as long. Its survival will depend on whether or not it can pull Italy out of an acute economic recession before next summer—none too brilliant a chance, but almost certainly the last one for Moro's coalition.

It seems beyond question that another failure would be one too many. The Christian Democratic-Socialist alliance that was to have changed the course of history here has brought only frustration and disappointment for the Italians. Time after time, both sides have sat down to explore their differences and, finding them unnegotiable, have returned to explore them again. Engrossed in an occult ritual of "clarification," they have never really gotten around to governing the country. The most memorable act of Moro's first center-left cabinet, which came to power in December, 1963, with a forty-five-page program that had taken a full seven months to negotiate, was to raise the price of matches and legal foolscap. The next one hardly did more than draw up the third draft of a Five-Year Plan that hasn't yet been sent to parliament.

Meanwhile, the economy has skidded into decline. During the last year, consumer demand has fallen off heavily. Investment in new plant, especially in textiles, machine tools, and household appliances, has slowed nearly to a stop. The construction industry has shrunk by nearly forty per cent, with 400,000 building workers laid off and as many more due to be unemployed by summer. An estimated half million workers in associated industries (cement, bricks, lumber) stand to lose their jobs at the same time. Several hundred thousand other workers have been cut down to a twenty-hour week.

ONE MIGHT ARGUE about how much of the blame for this can fairly be laid to the center-left coalition, which did not take over until the downward curve was already setting in. But few economists doubt that the trend could have been checked a year ago by energetic government intervention. The coalition leaders, however, could not find an adequate course of action that did not lead to irreconcilable doctrinal controversies.

The public has been remarkably forbearing. Italians have long been in the habit of regarding all government as inefficient and corrupt. Those who were inclined to favor the center-left experiment were aware that it could not start off smoothly. Yet even the experiment's warmest supporters are beginning to sense that too much time has been wasted in getting started, and that

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Italy is drifting toward the kind of crisis it has been fending off since the postwar republic was founded, in which the parties and parliament would no longer be able to furnish a viable democratic government of any complexion.

It was for fear of just such a crisis that the Christian Democrats reluctantly accepted the so-called Opening to the Left. The old center coalition, in which they were flanked by the smaller Social Democratic, Liberal, and Republican Parties, had been operating on a parliamentary majority that had been dwindling since 1953. In the present parliament, elected in 1963, the four parties hold less than fifty-three per cent of the seats and could not possibly form a government because of the antagonism on the part of the moderate Social Democrats—President Giuseppe Saragat's party—to the Liberals. If it were not for the Socialists, the Christian Democrats would have to govern in alliance with parties at the extreme Right or the extreme Left. As the political fog thickens, however, the boundaries between the Center and the extremes are growing increasingly blurred—particularly those on the Left.

The Christian Democrats strayed once toward the extreme Right and it proved a total failure. The government of the late Fernando Tambroni in 1960 lasted less than four months and so alarmed the country as a step toward Fascism that it had to be quickly dropped.

The Reasonable Reds

The other alternative, the Communist Party, has been *there* since the liberation of Italy. It is a huge, implacable force representing one in every four voters, by far the strongest opposition party in the country and, since the Socialists joined the government, the only one that counts. Everything done or not done by every government since the beginning of the republic has been conditioned by its presence, and every effort to loosen its hold on the working class has failed.

The strain of holding off the Communist Party was at least tolerable when it was obviously acting here as the agent of Stalin and the Red Army. After eight years of de-Stalinization, however, the Italian Communists are all but unrecognizable. One by one, as they have traveled along what the late Palmiro Togliatti called the Italian road to socialism, they have discarded their sectarian Marxist principles: revolution, total government control, atheism, even control of their internal factions, which, especially since Togliatti died last August, has been largely a fiction. Their disagreements appear public and their discipline slack; their press echoes heretical debates; with every step along Togliatti's road, they manage to look more and more reasonable and respectable.

At this stage, they are offering to collaborate in the country's reconstruction in terms that are regarded as a bargain by a considerable number of non-Communists. What they ask is just a voice—one among several—in the direction of Italy's domestic and foreign affairs. What they promise in exchange is a more fully democratic Communist Party, a commitment to uphold the republican constitution and the coexistence of competing political parties, and a guarantee to respect religious liberty and the special status of the Catholic Church. Furthermore, on the basis of their power among the workers, they offer long years of industrial peace.

Some Communists are prepared to be still more generous. According to Giorgio Amendola, a leading contender for Togliatti's job, the party should be ready to submerge and ultimately abandon its own identity in a single labor party that would include all lay forces to the left of the Christian Democrats—a formation embracing forty-eight per cent of the electorate. This leftist party, he says, should have a completely fresh ideological position, since "neither the Social Democratic nor the Communist solution, as proposed to the working class of Western European capitalist countries over the last fifty years, has proved valid."

Although criticized in Moscow as a revisionist, Amendola is rapidly gaining the ascendancy in the Italian Communist hierarchy; and even if he should be overtaken by his closest rival, Pietro Ingrao, the party's stand would scarcely be less accommodating. Whether Ingrao is or isn't a Stalinist at heart, as he is said to be, his differences with Amendola are largely tactical. Ingrao too would like to arrange the Communist entrance into a democratic coalition, but dealing only with the other big party, the Christian Democrats, leaving out the smaller leftist parties like the Socialists and Social Democrats.

If a Catholic-Communist alliance might seem unthinkable in Italy, of all places, some of the country's cleverest politicians have thought of it, foreseeing the day when the Church and the Communist Party might be brought together by the sheer inability of either one to overcome the other. Togliatti himself had had this in mind ever since he returned from Moscow after Mussolini's fall. He had carefully left the way open by making Communist deputies vote in favor of incorporating the Concordat with the Vatican

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in the new republican constitution, and then by announcing a policy of the "outstretched hand." Until not long ago, however, the hand was extended only to a marginal group of Catholics willing to grasp it unconditionally. Since 1962, the Communist Party has been on a different track entirely.

The tone was set at its Tenth Congress that year, where delegates were invited to debate the proposition that "Religion can have a revolutionary potential even in the present moment in history." In elaborating on this theme, party theorists have asserted more recently that "religious liberty is concomitant with our revolutionary path," that the "Communists' guarantee . . . to religious believers *is* the Italian road to socialism," and that current Soviet policy on the subject reflects not only a "brutally oversimplified view of religious sentiment" but a "fossilized, totemistic vision of Marxism." At the same time, anti-clericalism has vanished from party ranks. The defrocked priests who used to earn a modest living by addressing Communist meetings are all unemployed now, and the most prominent among them, the former Jesuit Alighiero Tondi, has gone back to the Church. Communist mayors march proudly these days at the head of local religious processions. In several towns near Rome, they refused point-blank recently to permit a performance of Rolf Hochhuth's controversial play about Pope Pius XII, *The Deputy*; and anti-religious tracts have been replaced on Communist bookshelves by Pope John XXIII's celebrated encyclical "Pacem in Terris."

THE ENCYCLICAL, which John wrote in mid-1963, has become a major element in Communist calculations. During the long reign of Pius XII, Catholics had been forbidden to collaborate with the Communists on pain of excommunication. John, on the other hand, called for a "spirit of comprehension . . . [towards those] disposed to work loyally to achieve objects by their nature good," going on to point out the need to distinguish between "erroneous philosophical doctrines" and "historical movements," between the error and those who err. At a time when the West itself was moving toward coexistence with the Communist world, Catholics might reasonably take this to mean that they were no longer bound by religious scruples to turn down the Communists' standing invitation for a "dialogue."

By now, the Catholic-Communist dialogue has become an important fact of Italian life. Starting in Florence, where the Christian Democrats' "Holy Mayor," Giorgio La Pira, had been preparing the climate for a decade, it has spread throughout Tuscany, Umbria, Emilia, the Romagna, Liguria, and Lombardy. In thousands of workers' and middle-class homes, the pros and cons of collaboration are discussed over coffee or wine, with a bulky volume called *Dialogo alla Prova* serving as a standard text. Written by ten Catholic and Communist intellectuals and edited by a left-wing Catholic concerned with "separating



atheism from Communism," the book goes a long way to confirm its editor's thesis that "Communists need no longer be treated as lepers." It doesn't reach any political conclusions, but it doesn't have to.

Though the dialogue has been going on beneath the surface of national politics, it has inevitably affected national politicians—especially Christian Democratic politicians and above all those with northern constituencies. None of the Catholic party's five organized factions is strong enough to be above all temptation, and two of them, controlling forty-two per cent of the party, have been taking a growing interest lately in what the Communists may have to offer. For the Basic Syndicalists, who come mostly from the Catholic trade unions, this is a matter of a community of interest. In their desire for a radical overhaul of Italy's social structure, they have more in common with their fellow unionists in the Communist CGIL than with their own party's conservative Dorotei led by Treasury Minister Emilio Colombo, or even with the middle-of-the-road Morotei headed by Premier Moro. Since the policies of the center-left coalition have been more or less dictated by Moro and Colombo, the Basic Syndicalists have been losing hope of getting anywhere with the coalition as it stands; and many of them are coming around to the belief that it will never get anywhere without the Communists' backing.

Fanfani, Past and Future

It is a lot less simple to classify the other left-wing faction, known as Nuove Cronache. The dedicated young men in this group are drawn together not so much by a definite political view as by fanatical loyalty to former Premier Amintore Fanfani, the Christian Democrats' most dynamic and enigmatic leader. His record of unpredictable behavior in the pursuit of the conquest of his party, however, has made him distrusted by many Christian-Democrats. For years he had fought a lonely battle for the Opening to the Left, but when his advice was finally accepted by the Christian Democratic leaders, he was not considered the proper man to run the experiment, and the job was entrusted to the more dependable Moro. For the man who once told a close associate, "The Center-Left is too important to be run by anyone but me," this was an unforgivable betrayal. Fanfani has neither forgiven it nor given up the hope of getting his job back, and he is a formidable operator.

The Nuove Cronache faction polls twenty-two per cent of the Christian Democratic vote and is a trim and disciplined little army responding smoothly to Fanfani's command. He has often used it with striking effectiveness, most notably when he stood independently as a candidate for the presidency of the republic last Christmas. For thirteen days his band of eighty-nine deputies and senators held tight, immune to the pleas and threats of the Christian Democratic leadership, who because of his candidacy could neither elect

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their own official candidate nor vote solidly for any other. By the time the Social Democrats' Giuseppe Saragat was elected on the twenty-first ballot, the Christian Democratic Party was shattered and Fanfani was the arbiter of its future.

Directly after that election, the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Republicans, and Socialists plunged into two months of negotiations with the sole purpose of inducing Fanfani to enter the government. He had refused to join the two previous center-left cabinets on the grounds that they were merely interim governments, and his overtures to the Communists during the presidential balloting clearly indicated how he intended to establish a stable one. "If Fanfani stays out," Socialist Vice-Premier Pietro Nenni told his intimates, "his deputies will block every important bill we send to parliament; and while I sit here in the cabinet with my hands tied, he will go over my head and make a deal with the Communists. Either he comes in or I go."

Although Fanfani did come in, as foreign minister, his presence is anything but reassuring. His faction has reconfirmed its serious reservations in regard to Moro's government, and he himself has explained that he entered "this cemetery" only because his party begged him to in the interests of unity. "I was asked to make a sacrifice," he said, "and I made it." He is unlikely to make many others.

According to Fanfani's followers, he doesn't actually have to *do* anything to unseat Moro. He need only wait for the premier and his cabinet to demonstrate again that they are unable to get the working-class cooperation indispensable to Italy's economic recovery. That being clear once and for all, the Christian Democrats would supposedly have to fall back on the only man, who, with the support of the Communists, can keep the workers under control—or who claims that he can.

CERTAINLY, the Communist leaders would prefer Fanfani to Moro. In fifteen months as head of the régime that preceded the center-left experiment, Fanfani had shown unexpected promise from the Communists' point of view. He nationalized



the electrical industry, taxed dividends, sanctioned a seventeen per cent wage increase, carried Italy from the center to the outer edge of the Atlantic Alliance, and was careful in general not to offend Communist sensibilities. "Fanfani was a courageous premier," Giorgio Amendola told me recently. "He was not afraid to break with big business, he was not ridden with antiquated and bigoted anti-Communist prejudices, and he had an open mind on foreign policy. He was the kind of man we Communists could live with."

But times have changed for the worse since Fanfani fell from power in 1963, and he could not expect the Communists to do for him what they will not do for Moro—accept a wage freeze and a no-strike pledge, for instance—without demanding a high price for their services. They have already suggested a few things they would want in exchange: workers' councils at the factory level with a voice in production and investment planning; compulsory national planning with the help of Communist consultants; Communist representation in the European Parliament; and an end to the Center-Left acceptable-majority formula, which precludes any governmental reliance on Communist votes in parliament.

Whether or not Fanfani is prepared to go that far (and probably farther, after starting down the slippery slope), other Christian Democrats are determined to deny him that freedom of choice. Once back in power, he could not easily be dislodged again; and regardless of the degree of his trust in the Communists, there are other Catholics around whose pro-Communist sympathies are unqualified. His warmest friend, for whom he has an almost worshipful reverence, is Giorgio La Pira, who has worked closely with the Florentine Communists for years; and the strength of his Nuove Cronache faction is concentrated in the same "Red" provinces of the north where the Catholic-Communist dialogue has been flourishing.

The Vatican Sounds an Alarm

The Catholic Church has not been indifferent to these developments. Fanfani has influential protectors in the Vatican, starting with its assistant secretary of state, Monsignor Dell'Acqua. He also has powerful enemies there who would stop at nothing to block him. The controversy over his policies is part of a much broader one swirling through Vatican halls since Pope John's brief but eventful reign. Some prelates think that John went too far too fast with his "Pacem in Terris," encouraging a political process he was too unworldly to foresee. Others consider it a brilliantly sophisticated document much more likely to disarm

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than to fortify the world Communist movement; and their view may be borne out by the fact that several Communist countries sent delegates to New York not long ago to attend a world peace symposium based entirely on this supremely religious appeal.

With things taking such an alarming turn in Italy itself, however, the hierarchy has been closing ranks. In the sharpest tone it has used for a decade or more, *Osservatore Romano* warned recently that the dialogue with the Communists has led Catholics into "an equivocal and dangerous empiricism." The day might come, it went on, "when spiritual and moral values are sacrificed to 'concrete results'; and from that may come surrender. The hour is grave, and the confusion of ideas can make it graver. It is the hour of responsibility and clarity, when infidelity must be called by its rightful name."

Soon afterward, Pope John's successor brought his own authority to bear. "We know how difficult it is," Paul VI told the workers of Catholic Action, "to live among workers with a different view of life . . . whose invitation to an understanding . . . seems natural and seductive, while every day it reveals fresh perfidy and trickery. . . . We exhort you to remain firm in your convictions."

In the greatly altered atmosphere here, however, the firmness of these convictions will not depend on papal exhortations alone. The days have passed when the Vatican's civic committees (recently reactivated by Pope Paul) could provide the Christian Democrats with millions of voters for an anti-Communist crusade, or when the Italian clergy could count on an automatic political response to a plea from the pulpit. The plea is no longer so convincing, the enemy looks less menacing, and Catholic workers are no less beset by nagging material worries than anybody else. Relief from these worries must be provided not by the Church but by the government.



RATHER LATE in the day, the coalition leaders are beginning to see this. Frightened by the deteriorating situation, the latest Moro cabinet has put all its differences aside for the moment, pushing through a billion-dollar omnibus bill to revive the languishing economy. After hitting bottom and staying there for going on two years, the stock market has started to rise again, and a cautious optimism in business circles is faintly discernible. The government is depending on this modest change to reverse a cycle which, economists say, would otherwise carry Italy from a serious recession to a chronic depression by summer. Only if the new trend continues, the reasoning goes, can the Moro régime survive.

Even assuming that the coalition parties win a breathing spell, they would still have to find a way of talking the workers into making the sacrifices necessary for long-term stabilization. The course they have been following lately is not persuasive. The long winter's quarrel over how to handle the economic emergency has ended with a full victory for the conservative wing. Practically all the compromising that went into the omnibus bill was done by the Socialists, who threw doctrine to the winds so as to restore business confidence and profit margins. Yet this very compliance could be self-defeating.

The Socialist Party, which started out on this adventure with 4,500,000 votes, has already lost a quarter of its members since joining the government, and nearly a third of those remaining are in mutinous opposition led by Riccardo Lombardi. Another year or two of yielding to conservative Christian Democratic pressure, and the Socialists might wind up as just another moderate middle-class party tagging along behind a familiar old center government—just as happened to Saragat's Social Democrats.

In that event, the center-left operation would be more than a failure. Even when the economic situation of Italy was improving, the Communists here were extraordinarily skillful in capturing a protest vote almost five times greater than their membership. With a further weakened Socialist Party, they would acquire the undisputed leadership of the whole class-conscious Italian proletariat, and their share of the national vote would inevitably be swollen by a sizable chunk of what the Socialists used to get. Yet it used to be said that the aim of the Opening to the Left was to take away voters from the Communist Party and to eliminate the danger that one day—alone or with other parties—it would have a hand in running the country!

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

Our Secret War in Laos

DENIS WARNER

VIENTIANE

UNTIL RECENTLY Prince Souvanna Phouma's stay in power as the premier of Laos was open to serious doubts. Yet today, he has emerged as a leader with unsuspected strength and authority. The dove has become a hawk, applauding the United States for bombing North Vietnam and urging it to greater efforts against Vinh, the town that is the Vietminh's main source of supply into Laos, and even against Hanoi.

Many things have changed in Laos in the past twelve months, including Souvanna, and almost all the changes have been for the better. A year ago the Communist Pathet Lao was doing very nicely. It had severed the road and river communications between the administrative and royal capitals of Vientiane and Luang Prabang, seized the foothills overlooking the Mekong River at Thakhek, and was about to drive the neutralist forces, under the command of General Kong Lae, from the Plain of Jars north of Vientiane.

The political scene was no less dismal. Souvanna seemed torn between what he regarded as a betrayal by his half-brother, Prince Souphanouvong, and his Vietminh backers on the one hand, and a desire on the other to maintain the government of national union set up by the 1962 Geneva accords. Time and again Souvanna threatened to pack up and end his days in comfort in France. No one would have been surprised to see him go.

The Right offered no alternative to Souvanna: its chronic corruption had become even more flagrant. To compensate for reduced allocations of American aid after the Geneva Agreements, the rightist General Phoumi Nosavan, then the deputy premier, sought funds to maintain his army and his patronage by opening a chain of casinos and what may well have been the world's biggest opium parlor, and by the manipulation of monoplies in gold, perfumes, and liquor.

In brief, the Royal Lao government, as represented by its neutralist and right wings, was rapidly falling apart, while the dissident Pathet Lao faction, with the power of the Vietminh behind it, was behaving precisely the way all but the most optimistic and gullible western signatories to the Geneva Agreements had expected. Laos indeed seemed lost, and, thanks to the security it afforded to the long section of the Ho Chi Minh Trail within its boundaries, South Vietnam was being lost along with it.

Changing Fortunes

What has happened since is largely the result of two coups separated in time by almost a year, the first in April, 1964, and the second just two months ago, in February. Firmly entrenched at last, the new Souvanna Phouma is for the moment confident and prepared to battle with the Vietminh; the road from Vientiane to Luang Prabang has been cleared of the Pathet Lao; its pirates no longer infest the Mekong; and last month sixty officer trainees and a small garrison of government troops at the Royal Lao Army school at Dong Hene in central Laos first withstood and then destroyed a Vietminh attack of battalion size in the most successful single operation of the war.

It would be unwise to exaggerate the importance of the gains or their durability. By the same token it can not be forgotten that the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which the Vietminh have now extended for motorized use well below the 17th parallel, is still a Communist sanctuary. Injections of foreign aid, mostly from the United States, alone keep the government solvent. Moreover, Prince Souphanouvong claims that any time the Pathet Lao wants to take Vientiane, or any other Mekong River town, it can do so—a boast that, with sufficient Vietminh aid from Hanoi, he could certainly make good.

Yet within these limits, much has been achieved. Souvanna commands more respect from the Right than ever seemed likely or even possible. Phoumi Nosavan has fled into exile, his place as finance minister taken by the reportedly incorruptible Sisouk Na Champassak, who once swore that he would never serve under Souvanna and is now a valued lieutenant of unquestioned loyalty. Tribal refugees in increasing numbers have left the Pathet Lao areas to seek the protection of the Royal Lao Army forces, and, in small but not insignificant matters, such as vegetable production, education, and village welfare, there

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are encouraging signs of progress.

Behind these changes is an intricate story of coup and countercoup, of plot and counterplot. The result has not led to disastrous divisions between the rightists and the neutralists but, through the elimination of the two most ambitious and dangerous men on the anti-Communist side—Phoumi Nosavan and General Siho Lamphouthacoul, the former chief of the national police force—to a degree of unity in Vientiane that holds out a reasonable prospect of stability. This has been accompanied by a dramatic and largely secret change in the tactics and policies of the neutralist and rightist forces and those who support them.

The April, 1964, coup which brought about these extraordinary changes reflected the rightists' bitterness and frustration at the Pathet Lao's exploitation of the Geneva Agreements in its attempt to take over all of Laos. The leaders of the coup, General Siho and General Kouprasith Abhay, the Vientiane commander, were bent on getting rid of Souvanna Phouma, whom they regarded as a weak and inept leader; as a secondary target, they had their sights on General Phoumi Nosavan. The generals succeeded in overthrowing Souvanna and were apparently about to assassinate him when the U.S. embassy, with strong support from the British and Australians, and more importantly from King Savang Vatthana, insisted on his reinstallation.

THOROUGHLY DISILLUSIONED now with the Pathet Lao, which by then had driven the neutralists out of the Plain of Jars and established political as well as military control over the area, Souvanna was fully receptive to the changes which the generals demanded, which the United States approved, and which Pathet Lao intransigence called for. At long last, the Pathet Lao and its Vietminh allies were about to get a taste of their own medicine.

Though Phoumi Nosavan was downgraded from deputy premier to finance minister and stripped of the monopolies and the fund-raising casinos from which his patronage and power flowed, he had not lost his ambition or his capacity for intrigue. Three times during the latter part of 1964—on July 22, August 4, and during Christmas week—government troops were out in the streets in Vientiane in anticipation of a coup by Phoumi.

Early this January an astrologer told Phoumi's wife that his forty-sixth year would be the best in her husband's life if it began with the good wishes of the community. For his birthday celebration, therefore, Phoumi sent out two thousand invitation cards for a party that was to begin at six in the morning and to continue for twenty-four hours. Until noon, the party was mainly a family affair; but from lunchtime onwards, cabinet ministers, generals, diplomats, and thousands of others poured into Phoumi's home bearing gifts. At nine o'clock in the evening he told an Australian diplomat that he was on his 160th glass of champagne; at six o'clock the next morning Phoumi was still on his feet and the champagne was still flowing. Surviving guests who hazarded a guess at the cost put it at $10,000, a tidy sum for a cabinet minister whose official income was only $80 a month.

Lost in the Stars

The year seemed to have begun in a manner to have delighted the stars, but exactly a week later Phoumi's house was in ruins and he had fled in exile to Thailand with General Siho. When Phoumi was dispossessed of his lucrative monopolies and opium and casino interests after April, 1964, he had found an ally in Siho, who had formerly been his protégé and more recently his enemy. With Phoumi's power curtailed, Siho had been able to use his new authority and his paramilitary police apparatus to create his own empire. Some of its smaller pillars were modest opium dens and gambling houses and the sale of Lao identity papers and passports to Chinese Communists anxious to go about their business in Thailand. Siho was rich, powerful, feared—and at thirty, intensely ambitious.

The series of events which led to their downfall began on January 31 when, at 8:35 P.M., troops under the command of Colonel Bounleut Saycocie took over Vientiane's radio station, stadium, and Ministry of Youth, Sports and Fine Arts. A few minutes later the colonel broadcast a message to the people explaining that he wanted to "rescue" the high command "in order to make the army a more effective fighting force and to save the country." What Bounleut had in mind is far from clear even now. In part, his minor coup seems to have been a protest against very low army pay; in part, it may have been what he says it was, an attempt to provoke Phoumi and Siho into an "ambush."

If this was his purpose he was wholly successful, for Phoumi and Siho proceeded to make their bid for power, ostensibly with the pretext of crushing Colonel Bounleut. This time Souvanna, again in his new firm role, gave the orders and General Kouprasith carried them out. The Phoumi-Siho countercoup ended with their ignominious flight to Bangkok, where Phoumi is reported to have a million dollars tucked away. But Vientiane will bear the scars of the brief but bitter struggle for a long time to come; some sixty people were killed, and Siho's parting shot was to blow up the city's radio transmitters and to destroy the intelligence files.

The abortive countercoup not only strengthened Souvanna's position at the head of the rightist-neutralist coalition but also restored full military control to a loyal high command. Souvanna himself now has the purpose and bearing of a courageous leader of a country involved in a fight for its life. He also reflects the confidence of a man getting the support he needs not only at home but also from the outside—namely from Washington. Just how this came about is something of a success story for U.S. policy, which for understandable reasons Washington has chosen to conceal rather than to publicize.

THE NEW American role in Laos dates back to the coup of April, 1964. Until that time the United States had watched protestingly but passively while Vietminh units from the north flagrantly ignored the Geneva Agreements, reinforcing the Pathet Lao on the Plain of Jars and elsewhere, and consolidating, extending, and improving the Ho Chi Minh supply route to South Viet-

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nam. To "honor" the agreements, which called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, Hanoi ordered home forty Vietminh soldiers, who passed through the International Control Commission's checkpoints; some eight to twelve thousand remained. Meanwhile the 666 members of the American Military Assistance Advisory Group had departed in their entirety. Tragically late, Washington began to recognize that the war in Laos and South Vietnam was indivisible, and that the Geneva Agreements, far from being the great victory for peace that some of their western architects had proclaimed, were a trap designed to remove the pressures and strains on the supply route to the Vietcong.

The United States had two choices: it could denounce the Geneva Agreements, openly intervene in the war once again, and perhaps lose the support of Souvanna and King Savang Vatthana; or it could follow the Pathet Lao ground rules. It chose the latter, and now from its own privileged sanctuaries in northeastern and northern Thailand, as well as from South Vietnam and the Seventh Fleet, it is working with the full approval of the Royal Lao government in an attempt to restore the balance destroyed by North Vietnam's disregard of the Geneva Agreements.

The change in American policy became apparent when Washington ordered reconnaissance flights along the main lines of communication between the Pathet Lao areas and North Vietnam. These flights not only revealed constant Vietminh reinforcement and resupply but also showed the presence of antiaircraft guns that fired on the American planes. The reconnaissance missions soon became retaliatory and finally offensive.

Impressed with the effectiveness of air power against Route 7—a road with many bridges that winds from North Vietnam to Luang Prabang through the narrow defiles of north-central Laos—the United States equipped the Royal Lao Air Force with additional T-28s. While Lao pilots were being trained at Udorn in northeastern Thailand, Thai mercenaries flew the planes. According to reliable sources, twenty-five Lao-speaking Thai pilots were originally employed and supplied with Lao papers and identity cards. A senior Lao official says that only a few of the Thai pilots remain; most, he says, are now Lao. This applies only to the air force, however, and not to the CIA operations through Air America, a fifty-plane transport group operating with American and multinational crews from Laos and Thailand and probably South Vietnam as well.

Grenades in the Rice Sacks

Air America has been spectacularly successful. Its role following the Geneva Agreements was to supply tribal groups loyal to the neutralists and rightists with foodstuffs, medicines, and other goods. It also supplied, at the request of the Royal

Lao government, the needs of two Royal Lao battalions isolated, harried, and more or less cut off in the region of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

By the middle of last year, increasing quantities of guns, grenades, and other weapons went along with the sacks of rice to the loyal mountain tribesmen who have become the guerrilla striking forces of the Royal Lao Army, operating in much the same fashion as the Vietcong guerrillas in South Vietnam. According to the Vietcong, captured Thai and Chinese Nationalist crewmen (whose photographs have been published along with those of Americans taken at the same time) have confessed that Air America is a paramilitary force. It would not be easy to dispute the description.

American fighter-bombers destroyed an important bridge at Ban Ban on Route 7 and have kept it out of commission, which promises many problems for the Pathet Lao when the wet season sets in next month. Well aware of this, the Pathet Lao tried to open a shorter alternative supply route to the Plain of Jars through Sam Neua. Immediately, they ran into guerrilla attacks. Air America had been on the job.

Around Muong Sai and Nam Tha in northwestern Laos, the guerrillas have become so confident that they have been pressing for permission to attack the towns held by the Pathet Lao. Here and elsewhere, the range and scope of their activities may be gauged from the fact that Air America and two subsidiaries now have access to more than two hundred airfields and airstrips, many of them far behind Pathet Lao lines. In the past few months, twenty new airstrips have been opened.

Two aspects of Air America's operations are of special significance. The Black Thai tribesmen from whom the guerrillas are recruited in northern Laos spill over into the Thai country of North Vietnam and could conceivably be used for the creation of an even more important insurgency situation; also, the U.S. special forces' emphasis on the "struggle for the hearts and minds of the people" is reflected in the huge number of refugees who have elected to move with the guerrillas out of Pathet Lao territory. More than a hundred thousand are now dependent on airlift and airdrop for their supplies. "I'd like to see how they sort out the bookkeeping in Washington," said one American. "I wonder how you figure out the bill on a flight that carries both guns and rice."

In one vital area, however, and among one vital group of tribesmen, there has been a conspicuous lack of success. The Khas of eastern and southeastern Laos in the general region of the Ho Chi Minh Trail remain firmly committed to the Pathet Lao. Apart from the less than successful efforts to interdict the trail by bombing, the United States appears to have fallen back on Vietnamese commandos—with what success no one will say. In a white paper published in January, the central committee of the Neo Lao Hak Xat Party, the political wing of the Pathet Lao, reported that four groups of commandos had been parachuted around Tchepone and Mu-

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ong Ngon, about twenty miles south of the main staging base at the point where the trail dissolves into tracks passable only by man or pony.

Presumably on the basis of this experience, U.S. officers do not believe that the southern part of the trail can be cut off either by bombing or even by the large-scale use of commando and ranger groups. A highly skilled force of several divisions would be needed for the job.

All of this adds up to something far short of victory—which was, in any event, hardly to be expected. Pushed too far, the new initiatives in Laos might have provoked repercussions that would have proved embarrassing to the United States with its heavy commitments in Vietnam. "In my view," said one reliable informant, "the bombing and supply from Udorn are very effectively done. No one is trying to go too far or too fast, but the use of air and the supply to guerrillas are important factors in this situation, both militarily and politically."

"I opposed the use of the T-28s," said another source. "I thought they would aggravate rather than help. I was wrong. Especially in the region of Route 7 leading to the Plain of Jars they have thrown complete confusion into the ranks of the Pathet Lao and the Vietminh. Consumer supplies have become seriously short there and no peasant is willing to risk his buffalo on the road any longer."

THERE ARE CRITICS, of course, among some U.S. friends and allies. As for the International Control Commission, it accepts phlegmatically the current and continuous violations of the Geneva Agreements by both sides. "We have made repeated applications to the Royal Lao government to investigate the activities of Air America," said one member. "We have never had a reply." Since the commission has never been allowed to investigate Pathet Lao areas, it is hardly surprised.

In military quarters the general feeling is that the Pathet Lao will make one of its usual offensives late in the dry season, this month or in May, to inflict what limited damage it can on the Royal Lao Army in the few weeks remaining before the monsoons blanket the mountains. But there are no signs of anything more serious—no thrust of the Pathet Lao and the Vietminh through to the Mekong, no march south by the Chinese. It is conceivable that the neutralist leader Kong Lae, who has bitterly resisted the assimilation of his eight thousand troops into the Royal Laotian Army, might still defect. What really matters, however, is that American intervention has provided a climate of confidence in which the government may even begin to govern.

Constitutional problems, the difficulty of holding elections, and the certainty that the Pathet Lao will not accept seats as nominated members in a new national assembly raise the possibility that the government of national union will cease to exist in name as well as in principle. The divisions between the rightists-neutralists and the Pathet Lao now appear unbridgeable. That this happened before all Laos fell into Communist hands is a stroke of good fortune that the anti-Communist leaders who brought about the Geneva Agreements scarcely deserve.

Senator Dirksen's Unexpected Allies

JULIUS DUSCHA

WHEN the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its controversial one man, one vote reapportionment decision ten months ago, both the opponents and proponents of the ruling predicted that within a year it would lead to a political revolution giving complete control of state legislatures to senators and representatives from cities and suburbs. By January, half of the legislatures were under Federal court orders to redistrict during 1965, and about a dozen had already completed reapportioning. But the revolution may not occur. Not only have the farmers, who have the most to lose politically, organized themselves to fight the court's decisions, but so have state legislators and businessmen who are accustomed to dealing with state governments as they are.

Moreover, the opponents of the reapportionment ruling have received unexpected support from such urban-oriented and liberal political figures as Republican Senator Jacob K. Javits of New York, and California's Democratic Governor Edmund G. Brown and Republican Senator Thomas H. Kuchel. Not a single governor of a major state has spoken out in support of the Supreme Court decision.

As such proponents of the ruling as Democratic Senator Paul H. Douglas of Illinois have discovered, there is a widespread feeling throughout the country that the Supreme Court seriously damaged a desirable part of the checks-and-balances system of American government. It is a feeling compounded of concern for minorities, of a rural nostalgia that still pervades the thinking of many city people, and of a genuine fear of all-powerful majority government. To all these arguments, Douglas and other supporters of the decision have replied that the majority should rule, and that the rural and small-town minorities should not have a veto in state legislatures over the desires and needs of the seven out of ten Americans who live in our cities and suburbs.

Riding the Tide

The debate between the opponents and proponents of the reapportionment decision is now focused on a Constitutional amendment sponsored by Senate Republican Leader Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois and thirty-seven other senators on both sides of the aisle. Their amendment would allow one house of a legislature to be apportioned "upon the basis of factors other than population." Supporters of the amendment generally interpret "factors" to mean geography, but the opponents of the Dirksen proposal as it is now written have argued that it could

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lead to districting based on race, religion, or the economic levels of a state's population.

The amendment further provides that any apportionment not based on population be "submitted to a vote of the people" and approved by a majority before it becomes effective. It also declares that "the right and power to determine the composition of the legislature of a state and the apportionment of the membership thereof shall remain in the people of that state," a provision that the opponents of the amendment have attacked as removing the power of the courts to review the districting of legislatures.

The referendum provision has given the amendment an attraction lacking in a similar proposal suggested last summer by Dirksen, who stirred up the apportionment controversy when he tried to attach to the foreign-aid bill a rider postponing the effect of the Supreme Court's ruling, thereby gaining time to win approval of a Constitutional amendment. His proposal was filibustered by Douglas and other liberals for about a month, after which the Senate approved a watered-down rider expressing the "sense of Congress" that legislatures should be given six months to reapportion themselves before the Federal courts could order them to do so. This was a far cry from a separate bill passed earlier by the House that would have stripped the Federal courts of all power over state apportionment. The Senate rider was, in fact, considered meaningless by those trying to overturn the Supreme Court's decision, and it was dropped by the Senate-House conferees on foreign aid.

Most proponents of the reapportionment ruling assumed that the fight was over when Congress ratified the conferees' action and adjourned last fall. But, as he has done on many issues in recent years, Dirksen surprised everyone by coming back with more political strength than before.

All the Republican senators except Clifford Case of New Jersey have joined with Dirksen as co-sponsors of the new amendment, which has also gained the support of Democrats from the smaller Midwestern and Western states and the South. Companion amendments in the House have been sponsored by ninety representatives. An informal committee of four Democratic and four Republican representatives has been organized to keep members informed on reapportionment developments in the states and to make regular head counts of support in the House for the amendment.

Both liberals and conservatives are attracted to the amendment. Rural areas and small towns have served as important conservative Republican power bases for generations. On the other hand, liberal Republicans like Javits and Kuchel believe that the reapportionment ruling would assure Democratic control of their state legislatures for many years. Brown is concerned that in California, where Los Angeles and its environs, with 6.7 million residents, now have but one state senator, reapportionment would lead to the election of half a dozen or more extreme right-wing Republicans from conservative strongholds in the region. All three men also believe that the people of a state ought to be given a chance to vote on the apportionment of one house of their legislature. The referendum tradition is especially strong in California, where three efforts to redistrict the state senate have been rejected by voters in recent years. And Javits places particular stress on the incorporation in the Dirksen amendment of guarantees of judicial review and reconsideration of districting by legislatures on a regular basis.

The support from liberals for the Dirksen amendment has been a gratifying bonus for the essentially conservative forces lobbying in Washington and in the state capitals for the approval this year of the amendment. This will require a two-thirds vote in the Senate and House as well as ratification by the necessary three-fourths of the legislatures. The Dirksen supporters know they are racing against time. Once a legislature redistricts and the new urban and suburban majorities take over, they are unlikely to ratify the Dirksen amendment. But its proponents believe that once it is approved by Congress and sent to the states for ratification, the Federal courts will suspend reapportionment orders to give the states a chance to act on the amendment. In most cases, the redistricting plans that the Federal courts have ordered legislatures to work out this year will not go into effect until the 1966 elections; thus it would still be possible for governors to call special sessions of legislatures as presently constituted to ratify the amendment.

Applying the Pressure

The amendment campaign at the state level is being directed by an organization called the National Commission on Constitutional Government. Headed by former State Senator Hal Bridenbaugh of Nebraska and Speaker Thomas Graham of the Missouri house of representatives, the commission is made up of powerful conservative members of state legislatures.

The members of the Commission on Constitutional Government are among the most active participants in the General Assembly of the States, a biannual meeting sponsored by the Council of State Governments. The assembly is an important sounding board for political ideas. At its latest meeting in December in Chicago, the assembly endorsed the principle of apportioning one house of a legislature on a basis other than population and urged legislatures to make "application" to Congress to call a Constitutional convention to approve and submit to the states an amendment along the lines of the Dirksen proposal.

So far, twenty-two legislatures have forwarded such "applications" to Congress, and in five other states one house of the legislature has approved the call for a convention. Forty-seven legislatures meet this year and most of them are still in

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session. The "application" movement—a method of amending the Constitution that has never been used—also has the backing of such organizations as the Southern Governors' Conference, state Farm Bureaus, state and local chambers of commerce, state federations of retailers, and associations of manufacturers and other businessmen.

THE WASHINGTON OFFICES of the same farm and business organizations are also urging U.S. senators and representatives to vote for the Dirksen amendment. Particularly active are the lobbyists for the American Farm Bureau Federation, whose members have a direct interest in maintaining the apportionment of one house of a legislature on an area basis, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which on most domestic issues reflects the views of small-town rather than big-city businessmen. The two organizations have co-operated on many issues ranging from farm subsidies to opposition to Medicare. They are particularly adept at stimulating pressure on members of Congress from influential voters and campaign contributors in their home states.

The Senate hearings that began early last month on the Dirksen amendment and two similar proposals have had the effect of reinforcing the position of the opponents of the Supreme Court decision, although Senator Birch Bayh (D., Indiana), the chairman of the Constitutional Amendments subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee holding the hearings, has remained neutral. Senators, representatives, and state legislators have testified for the amendment. Only a few Senatorial voices in opposition have been heard at the hearings, and just one big-city mayor, Richard J. Daley of Chicago, found time to testify against it. No governors appeared in opposition. The House Judiciary Committee plans hearings later this spring on the ninety amendments introduced in the House.

Senator Douglas believes that the only hope of stopping the amendment in the Senate is to turn the issue into a civil-rights question. In both North and South, the new political power of the Negroes is concentrated in the cities that have so much to gain from the one man, one vote decision. The initial reaction of civil-rights groups to the Dirksen amendment was based largely on their own legislative priorities, and this year voting-rights and Federal-aid-to-education bills come first. However, a number of civil-rights leaders plan to testify against the amendment when the subcommittee hearings resume, and their organizations are already on record in opposition to the Dirksen amendment, as are such other groups as the AFL-CIO, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the American Jewish Congress. Aides to Douglas and some of the other Democratic senators opposing the amendment have set up the National Committee for Fair Representation, but it consists of little more than a Washington office and a stack of pamphlets warning against "the vote shrinkers."

Douglas has acknowledged that the referendum clause in the Dirksen amendment is the most difficult part to combat. In his testimony be-



fore the Bayh subcommittee, Douglas argued that "the right of a citizen to have his vote count with equal weight to that of another citizen in the election of representatives is an unalienable right in our republic" and declared that "it is not the prerogative of any majority to reduce this right," citing the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to support his argument.

An even more basic problem facing the opponents of the Dirksen amendment, however, is the sincere feeling that it is part of the American system for one house of legislature to be apportioned on an area basis. In some states one house has always been districted largely on a population basis while the other house has traditionally been represented on an area basis. In other states disparities between the two houses grew out of the legislature's refusal to reapportion as cities and suburbs grew.

The failure of legislatures to enact legislation meeting the social and economic needs of the twentieth century is only partly a result of malapportionment. Also hamstringing state government are such factors as outdated constitutions, limitations on debt and taxing powers, and restrictions on the authority of governors. Even some of the staunchest supporters of the one man, one vote decision have come to acknowledge that the ruling would not lead to the automatic reform of legislatures, as was so glibly predicted last summer. City and suburban representatives may be no more willing to enact tax measures than their rural counterparts have been, and the need to raise large sums in additional tax money is at the crux of most state problems.

WHAT probably will emerge from the Senate Judiciary Committee is an amendment close to the Dirksen proposal but with additional safeguards. These would include provisions reaffirming the authority of Federal courts to review the apportionment of legislative seats, requiring periodic reviews of the apportionment of seats by the legislatures themselves, declaring that districting may not be based on race or religion, and spelling out referendum procedures so that voting on an apportionment plan will be conducted fairly.

When an amendment reaches the Senate floor, its opponents will probably filibuster again. But there is already talk among some of the liberals about the kind of changes they would try to make in the amendment if it looked as if the proposal could not be stopped; and these changes are not expected to differ much from those which may emerge from the Judiciary Committee.

Most Americans regard legislatures as miniatures of Congress, where every state is allocated two Senate seats regardless of its population. This Great Compromise of the Constitutional Convention was reached for the same reasons that explain so much of the support for the Dirksen amendment—the fear of untrammeled majority rule.

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

The French Press Warms Up to LBJ

EDMOND TAYLOR

PARIS

"WITH the resolute spirit that has won him his Washington reputation as a doer," a French editorialist said recently, "President Johnson has undertaken to clean up a century-old aftermath of the bloody and atrocious War of Secession. Nobody in the United States has dared before to challenge this famous Ku Klux Klan . . . In doing so LBJ joins the tradition of his great predecessors—Roosevelt, La Guardia, J. Edgar Hoover, Bob Kennedy—who have successively fought against bootleggers, gangsterism, prostitution, McCarthyism, and corrupt labor unions." Though the pantheon of American folk heroes to which Mr. Johnson is thus elected may look somewhat mixed, not to say confused, in American eyes, the French journalist's complimentary intent is unmistakable. The fact that the editorial appeared in the Gaullist daily *La Nation* does not necessarily indicate a high-level decision to abate the anti-American campaign that the government-controlled electronic media and part of the French press have been conducting for more than a year. What is significant is that for some weeks past both the Gaullist and the opposition press have reflected a new and generally more favorable image of the American President in the French public mind. The United States remains the butt of nationalist prejudice or suspicion. American policy in Vietnam is under concerted fire from Kremlin-directed political warfare and local opportunism or defeatism, but LBJ himself is usually spared. In fact, his personality has suddenly become a major U.S. psychological asset in Europe.

The phenomenon is all the more striking because until quite recently even the most pro-American elements in France seldom voiced anything approaching admiration for Mr. Johnson's character and attainments. The portrait that the anti-American press offered the French public was a grotesque and vicious caricature. The one virtue LBJ appeared to possess in French eyes was that of not being Barry Goldwater. Various factors contributed to the relatively unfavorable French impression of Mr. Johnson: the extravagant European Kennedy cult, systematically exploited by some French and American admirers of the murdered President to diminish his successor; the combined impact of Communist and Gaullist anti-American propaganda, focused on Johnson as a major target; and most lately, the sniping from French columnists and editorial writers who oppose his Vietnam policy.

THE CHANGE in the French attitude began early this year when the French press discovered that LBJ's pursuit of the Great Society was in earnest. "President Johnson has wisely decided to go down in American history as a leader who introduced more justice into American society," wrote the left-nationalist *Combat*, hitherto no great admirer. Then came the civil-rights message to Congress, which stirred real enthusiasm here. "President Johnson," *La Nation* editorialized on March 17, "has just delivered an address on justice worthy of his ardent predecessor and of the great Abraham Lincoln."

When the President launched his attack on the Ku Klux Klan, anti-American propagandists here found themselves suddenly embarrassed by the weird myths about American public life they had been toiling for more than a year to implant or fortify in the French mind. America, they had been saying, is virtually ruled by a vast conspiracy of right-wing terrorists, political bigots, and gangsters, covertly supported by Texas millionaires, the defense in-

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dustries, and war hawks in the government. Despite the findings of the Warren Commission, it was this Mafia that had assassinated President Kennedy; the killers had accomplices in the FBI, the Pentagon, and perhaps, some Gaullist organs seemed to hint, in the White House itself.

The result, when President Johnson denounced the Ku Klux Klan—assumed to be an American counterpart of the Secret Army Organization in Algeria or of the prewar Cagoulards—was a reaction of mingled admiration and dread on the part of the French public. The President's stand seemed so courageous as to be almost foolhardy. "Rifles with telescopic sights are still sold freely in the United States," *La Nation* warned darkly.

The unpalatable facts could not be avoided: whatever his faults, LBJ was evidently a man of character. Even his Vietnam policy, it was reluctantly agreed, proved that. "Of course President Johnson is being misled by the Pentagon," a French friend of mildly leftish opinions said to me, "but I don't believe any more that he's a mere puppet in their hands. He is taking the action that he himself thinks is right."

A Grudging Respect

As the President stuck doggedly, day after day, to the course he had set for the nation, despite the rising clamor at home and abroad for negotiations, despite criticism from what the French think of as the overwhelming majority of the U.S. press, including the New York *Times* and Walter Lippmann, respect for him as a leader increased, even among Frenchmen who strongly fear or disapprove the direction in which he is trying to lead. Perhaps Mr. Johnson reminds them of someone they know.

Nicolas Chatelain, the Washington correspondent of *Le Figaro,* one of the few French journalists who take a relatively unmythological view of the United States, helped the favorable evolution of the Johnson image here with a dispatch pointing out the parallel between the President's policy toward the Ku Klux Klan and his policy toward the Vietcong. "In the one case as in the other," Chatelain asserted, "a provocation is involved. Johnson considers he has been defied and therefore cannot honorably dicker with the adversary."

René Dabernat, an influential commentator writing in the country's most popular mass-circulation weekly, *Paris-Match,* criticizes Washington's "psychological error" in the use of non-lethal gas, and warns that U.S. intervention in the Vietnam war will eventually prove self-defeating unless it is accompanied by a program of constructive peace aims, but he offers the most basic defense of President Johnson's Vietnam policy yet presented the French public.

"America has discovered," Dabernat writes, "that the European withdrawal [from Asia] it originally desired has offered a springboard to Communism instead of providing a basis for peace. This has happened not because decolonization was unnecessary, but because it has been too often accompanied by immediately exploited humiliations or defeats of the white nations. Dien Bien Phu was followed by the Algerian war . . . Suez, etc. The retreat of a white power much greater than France—namely the United States—would entail much more weighty consequences. That is why President Johnson decided to call a halt."

Dabernat's editorial comment capped an illustrated report from two *Match* correspondents in South Vietnam, Jean Durieux and Daniel Camus, both veterans of the French campaigns in Indochina, demonstrating that thanks to our air attacks on North Vietnam, the ground war in South Vietnam has changed radically for the better.

The *Match* article has since been corroborated by Max Clos, the *Figaro* correspondent in South Vietnam, and by Georges Chaffard, writing in the weekly *L'Express.* Chaffard's testimony in favor of Johnson's Vietnam policy is all the more striking because it is both unintentional and informed. This leading neutralist journalist has recently returned to Paris from the neutralist conference at Pnompenh and also, according to *L'Express,* from a sojourn with the Vietcong. Contrary to a widespread belief in Europe, the new U.S. bombing policy, Chaffard says, is really weakening the guerrillas by cutting down the flow of military supplies from the North. Chaffard also pictures the Communist leaders in Hanoi as dreading the destruction of North Vietnam's industrial equipment, which has been built up at the cost of immense effort and sacrifice. Above all, Chaffard stresses the impact of the policy change on South Vietnamese morale. "The show of force by the U.S. aircraft," he writes, "the establishment of Marines in central Vietnam, the utilization of new weapons, the relative passivity of China and Russia have had the effect of checking the pacifist tide that was beginning to sweep everything before it in Saigon. The capital is no longer sure that the Vietcong guerrillas are necessarily the future victors. America's determined stand has made people reconsider."

Of all the inadvertent propagandists for President Johnson here, the weightiest, however, is undoubtedly Jean-Paul Sartre, who at the beginning of April gave the weekly *Nouvel Observateur* a much-publicized article telling why he had turned down an invitation to visit the United States for a series of lectures. It would be a waste of precious time, Sartre explained, to make the trip just to encourage American intellectuals like the Cornell professors who invited him to criticize the administration's Vietnam policy. "No discussion is possible," he wrote, "unless there is already a basis of agreement to question the whole American imperialist position, not only in Vietnam but in South America, in Korea, and in the entire third world." The arousal of American opinion, the reluctant Nobel Prize winner continued, "can only be brought about through some extreme crisis such as a military disaster or the serious threat of a world war. . . . If the Americans are driven out of Saigon," Sartre argued, "there will be repercussions throughout the third world and eventually disorders in Latin America."

Revolution in Latin America is, of course, the supreme Sartrian goal. Sartre's article may dispel the doubts some Americans and friends of America still hold concerning the wisdom of President Johnson's decision not to retreat from Asia.

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VISTA: A New Kind Of Public Service

HANNAH LEES

THE Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), who are in fact the domestic Peace Corps, represent a small but potentially important development in President Johnson's war against poverty. The first eighty-five members are now at work, and another sixty-eight are in training. More than fourteen thousand have applied, and in the most recent tally, 1,360 applications had been received in a single week. By the end of June, VISTA hopes to have 2,000 volunteers around the country. This is hardly an army, but then, the Peace Corps, which now has ten thousand at work around the world, trained only nine hundred in its first year.

Just what needs to be done, who are available to do it, how they should be trained, and what the probable cost would be were thoroughly explored in 1962-1963 by a cabinet-level study group appointed by President Kennedy and headed by Robert Kennedy, then Attorney General. The document it produced, *Information on a Proposed National Service Program,* became the blueprint for the present VISTA operation. The study group's findings and recommendations were translated into a bill that passed the Senate in 1963. Opposition in the House, however, delayed final passage until last August, when it was included as one of the final provisions of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. The program was named VISTA rather than the domestic Peace Corps because the act establishing the original Peace Corps stipulated that no other organization could use the same name.

VISTA is much easier to qualify for than the Peace Corps, and its selection methods are pleasantly unbureaucratic. Until the volunteer arrives for training, there is no personal interview or physical examination. Selection is done through brief forms that the applicant and eight people who know him are asked to fill out, giving an indication of his character, capabilities, and interests. The applicant is asked where he would most like to serve. Enlistment is for one year. VISTA officials are making the reasonable assumption that no one will go to the trouble of getting eight references for a rigorous, essentially nonpaying job unless he really wants it. They have also tried to plan six-week training courses sufficiently realistic and difficult for candidates to weed themselves out.

Wherever There Is Poverty

After they have been trained and formally accepted, the volunteers are assigned to local programs that have asked Washington for help; migrant camps, Indian reservations, urban-renewal projects, rural education projects, and schools for retarded children have a high priority. Once assigned to a project, the volunteer becomes an integral part of its working force and is responsible only to his local superiors, who may even pay his board and room if their budget permits. Normally VISTA expects to support most of its volunteers. Estimates of their subsistence allowances run from around $2,000 a year for volunteers on Indian reservations or in hospitals to a little more than $3,000 for those who have to rent rooms in cities. During the volunteer's tour of duty, VISTA will also bank $50 a month, which he will be paid at the end of his enlistment.

It is, of course, too soon to know how effective the volunteers will be, but it might be useful to take a look at a few of them to see how their backgrounds and basic abilities have fitted them for the work that VISTA expects them to do in the next year.

For instance, sixty-six-year-old Jay Holmes retired in 1959 as a superintendent of schools in Michigan. His wife, who is three years younger, had taught before their marriage and done various volunteer tasks since then. They are starting work at a migrant-labor camp in California, where they will live with the laborers, helping them improve their housing and housekeeping, teaching illiterate adults, and trying to prepare their neglected pre-school children to go to school with average children. Since this is largely a Spanish-speaking group, the Holmeses are hard at work learning the language.

Althea Bee Wolcott, a tall, energetic woman of seventy-three, was a physical-education instructor at Wisconsin State College. She has been assigned to a remote area in the Kentucky mountains where some community-action programs are now starting under a grant from the Office of Economic Opportunity. Ten VISTA volunteers will go there eventually, but as the first she will be on her own to begin with. Her main tasks will be to develop recreational facilities for teen-agers, tutor school dropouts, and try to broaden the cultural experience of pre-school children.

Clarence Willingham, a twenty-four-year-old Negro from Georgia, was turned down by the Peace Corps because he has two artificial legs. He is an expert in electronics and has tutored other youngsters for fun. He has been sent to a school for retarded children in Donelson, Tennessee.

Projects in Carolina

These three volunteers and nine others began their six weeks' training on January 4, under the supervision of the North Carolina Fund. This fund, established in 1963 by a group of private citizens headed by former Governor Terry Sanford, has been given $9.5 million—$7 million from the Ford Foundation and the balance from the local Reynolds and Babcock Foundations—for a four-year attack on poverty in the state. A hundred North Carolina college students were recruited last spring (seven hundred applied) to take a few days' intensive briefing under the direction of the University of North Carolina and then go out in groups of ten for two and a half months of supervised work in newly organized action programs at the community level. The students helped to improve housing and worked with

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children and teen-agers, and were so successful, fund officials report, that local people are in many cases carrying on where they left off.

Last August the fund hired a full-time training director and established two other year-long courses, one for recent college graduates to work in programs around the state as "community-action technicians," another for men and women with administrative experience to act as "community-action co-ordinators." It was thus well equipped to train VISTA volunteers, and North Carolina certainly has plenty to teach them about poverty. Half of the state's families have incomes under $4,000, compared to less than one in three for the entire country; nearly a quarter have incomes under $2,000. North Carolina is forty-fourth in the years of school completed, tying with Arkansas and Mississippi at an average of 8.9 grades for its adult citizens.

The VISTA group, ranging in age from twenty to eighty-one, spent two weeks at a church camp in the woods near Chapel Hill being briefed on the kind of problems that the volunteers would be dealing with. On January 16, they moved out for three weeks of supervised field work before taking on their final assignments.

In addition to this group, twenty-four volunteers have been trained at a former maritime base in St. Petersburg, Florida, where sociologists from the Florida Institute for Continuing Studies, a statewide extension service, gave them classroom instruction in the complex roots of poverty. Another thirty-four have just completed a training course set up by the Columbia School of Social Work to prepare them for work in urban slums. Since half of our country's poor live in cities, presumably about half of the VISTA volunteers will have assignments in urban slums.

The North Carolina Fund has now trained a second group, twenty-five this time. Twenty-five are in training at Tempe, Arizona, and will spend four weeks on the Salt River Indian Reservation before being assigned permanently to other reservations throughout the West. The University of Maryland School of Social Work is training forty-three more applicants in a former convent and parochial school it has rented in the heart of the Baltimore slums.

In every case, these training programs have been contracted for between VISTA and whatever school or foundation does the training, and are paid for out of VISTA appropriations. For example, a contract is about to be signed with the North Carolina Fund to train several more VISTA groups this year, and negotiations are under way with some forty or fifty universities across the country for training future groups.

ONE significant fact that quickly emerges in the training process is that VISTA volunteers will be combating illiteracy in one age group or another wherever they go. This is to be expected, since statistics show a clear connection between illiteracy and poverty. Yet illiterates have proved eager to learn if someone offers them the chance and enough individual attention. What is more, pre-school education plays an essential part in almost every program. It is a relatively new idea that was first tried out in New York a

few years ago and has since been successfully copied elsewhere. Though it may seem paradoxical to talk of three- and four-year-old illiterates, children who have never been talked to and who have never seen anything but four dirty walls simply do not speak the same language as children who have been brought up in normal homes. Whatever their natural intelligence, they cannot enter first grade or even kindergarten with average children and hope to keep up. But with intensive attention and exposure to new experiences, they are able to bridge the gap.

Though VISTA is the smallest project of the Office of Economic Opportunity, it relates with the OEO's other two direct responsibilities—the Job Corps and the stimulation and financing of Community Action Programs. Of the $784 million appropriated under the Economic Opportunities Act for fiscal 1965, VISTA's share was $4.5 million. Of the $1.5 billion that the OEO has requested for fiscal 1966, VISTA hopes to get $24.5 million, five times what it will have spent this fiscal year. It will need that much to increase the number of volunteers from 2,000 to a projected 5,000 and maintain them, if only at subsistence levels.

VISTA's director, Glenn Ferguson, is hoping that his organization will be so well known by June that there will be a flood of applicants when the schools and colleges close. He has come to count on the interest of this age group, but there is one special group he wants to tap and may have trouble reaching. He wants rank-and-file volunteers from trade unions who might get a year's leave of absence from their jobs to work with the poverty program. Union workers, he believes, now tend to feel threatened by the drive to train large numbers of the jobless. If enough of them could be made to understand that raising the living standards of slum dwellers in the end only creates more jobs, they could have an important influence on the often narrow outlook of organized labor.

THE PROBLEMS that the VISTA volunteers will encounter will be massive, and often not so much in working among the poor themselves as in simply trying to fit into local anti-poverty programs. This potentially difficult situation was described to the North Carolina trainees by the director of Craven County's Operation Progress, in which some of them did their field work:

"You're going to be involved in community action," he told them, "working with old-timers who aren't as steamed up as VISTA. What the President and Sargent Shriver say isn't necessarily what local people feel, you know. Craven is one of the first counties to get money from the President's poverty program and they're honored. But at the same time they have a feeling Washington is trying to take away all the power they have. So don't say, 'This is what they told us in Washington.'"

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The Elusive Genius Of T. S. Eliot

LESLIE PAUL

With T. S. Eliot's going, a whole age of English literature comes to an end. The king is dead; but not only is the king dead. There is no heir apparent, and perhaps that too is an indication of how literature has changed under his rule and by his influence. For no man behaved less like a king, or felt less like one: one has only to contrast him with George Bernard Shaw or even H. G. Wells or with great national poets of the past, Kipling or Tennyson, or with contemporary politico-literary prophets like Bertrand Russell or J. B. Priestley, to see that. Tom Eliot never was, and never wanted to be, out there among the prima donnas, pontificating or presiding over the nation. The man's modesty was almost a disease. Indeed, he must have worn even as a young man the hooded, disengaged look of Mr. Prufrock, fingering his tie and climbing the stairs to the drawing room to count out his life in coffee spoons. In recent years, a dry, precise old eagle with a lined face and thin hair plastered down, he had sometimes seemed one whose days had been spent guarding financial secrets.

I first met him in 1943 or 1944. I went clumping up the stairs in my soldier's boots to meet him in the little flat I think he even then occupied at the top of Fabers' house at 24 Russell Square. Fabers had just accepted a book on the crisis in western civilization which I had been writing, with some desperation, in the nooks and crannies of my army life. "Tom Eliot's read it, Tom thinks highly of it," Geoffrey Faber had said with his great rubicund beam, as though that sealed the matter. And so here I was coming to see T. S. Eliot and even more defensively shy than he was and more than a little in awe. I cannot remember much that he said, except that I found myself questioning him about his writing life rather more than he questioned me about mine. It was at a later talk in that small room among the chimney tops of Bloomsbury when I was out of the army that I recall saying I had filled an army exercise book with epigrams about belief and unbelief, but I found it was too slight an affair to make a book. He brightened up. "With *footnotes* it might be?" he said, and my mind skated to the somewhat portentous role footnotes had played in "The Waste Land," swelling it out with obscure and unnecessary scholarship.

When a third book with Fabers was on the stocks and I was talking about it to Geoffrey Faber on the landing at Russell Square, Eliot loped past me in that shy way of his and flashed me a look of whiplash brightness. "I'm watching everything you write," he said with a minatory friendliness. His kindness and consideration for me as a young writer just back from the forces was heartening and encouraging: it made a crucial difference. Many another writer owed him as much, of course, and I was never his intimate.

What I have to offer in memory of this great man is only "a heap of broken images" like his own Waste Land. I see him standing white-faced, sad eyes averted, at Faber literary parties, or breathing rather than reciting his poetry to us (he suffered from emphysema) in the Jerusalem Chamber at Westminster Abbey, in which the quietness was like a pain, for when he spoke it, a dry sadness seemed to load his poetry. There were moments too when one felt that he was dragging himself back from some Platonic cave to the contemporary world, it seemed such an effort to communicate, even when it was an occasion he loved, such as presiding over meetings of the London Library or with old friends at the dining club of which we were both members.

He was a literary legend long before I met him, and I wish it had been possible to know him before the laurels were thick upon his brow. Of course as a youngster I had seen him on some rare literary occasion bounding up the stairs to the platform, and in a remarkable documentary film of the 1930's on the arts when he said, "You should read contemporary poets simply because they are contemporary." He invited us to share the vivid immediacy of the poets' reaction to the world we ourselves were living in, rather than to expect every poet to be immortal before he could qualify for our favor.

It was during the reign of the Georgian Poets that Eliot published his first volumes of poetry, scandalizing those who got around to reading them. They astounded us. Here was no tweedy heartiness, no primrose echoes of Tennyson or Wordsworth, but an extreme sophistication, a truly urban poetry full of the ennui and melancholy of great cities.

The images were unforgettable:

> Of restless nights in one-night cheap hotels
> And sawdust restaurants with oyster shells . . .
>
> The winter evening settles down
> With smells of steaks in passageways.
> Six o'clock.
> The burnt-out ends of smoky days.

A whole pre-1914 world is summed

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up for all who remember it in just two lines:

A lonely cab-horse steams and stamps.
And then the lighting of the lamps.

Then, again quite unforgettable:

The yellow fog that rubs its back
upon the window-panes,
The yellow smoke that rubs its muzzle
on the window-panes
Licked its tongue into the corners
of the evening,
Lingered upon the pools that stand
in drains,
Let fall upon its back the soot that
falls from chimneys,
Slipped by the terrace, made a sudden
leap,
And seeing that it was a soft October
night,
Curled once about the house, and
fell asleep.

After the Georgian Poets, the audacity of that kind of poem-making wakened us like a viper's sting. But after "Preludes" and "Prufrock" there was "The Waste Land." It is hard today to recapture the shock of that long poem. Here was a poet who disdained to explain himself. What did the poet mean? Was he just a retailer of "brokén images" or master of his own discourse? There *was* no overt discourse. One had to quarry this craggy, glittering mountain for the ore. Ought one to have read all the learned books Mr. Eliot footnoted?

WHEN one did, the only result was that one knew what had been in his mind when he was writing. They did not actually tell us what he meant. That remained as obscure. The mandarin disdain for his readers was one thing, but his contempt for other poetic conventions was just as staggering—the endless and rather precious quotations of other poets or the deliberate slide into parody, for instance, which was so incredible a poetic risk to take:

But at my back from time to time
I hear
The sound of horns and motors, which
shall bring
Sweeney to Mrs. Porter in the spring.
O the moon shone bright on Mrs.
Porter
And on her daughter
They wash their feet in soda water

Or the falling away in the final lines to what seemed to be the mutterings

of a far from coherent madman:

These fragments I have shored against
my ruins
Why then Ile fit you. Hieronymo's
mad againe.
Datta. Dayadhvam. Damyata.
Shantih shantih shantih

If his techniques floored us, what of the whole poem? Overtly meaningless as it appeared, what came across seemed to speak to our condition as young men facing a postwar world still crumbling around us and filled with hollow men. We were living in a waste land and seeking the Holy Grail. The tremendous emotion of confusion and glory and despair which burned through the poem was our emotion and we too lived expecting dread events:

Who are those hooded hordes swarming
Over endless plains, stumbling in
cracked earth
Ringed by the flat horizon only
What is the city over the
mountains
Cracks and reforms and bursts in
the violet air
Falling towers
Jerusalem Athens Alexandria
Vienna London
Unreal

In T. S. Eliot, poetry came home to us: it belonged at last to the cities and the towns in which we lived. If he had accomplished only that, it would have been much.

I SUPPOSE he never again reached such a vividness of metaphor and emotion. It is in his early poetry that he stormed up to join the immortals. Some critics have said that all that follows the early poetry is really poetizing, not the true stuff. This is to impose altogether too rigid and intolerant a standard. Poetry is not simply image-making or even emotional tension. There is an acceptable tradition, a Goethean tradition, of poetry which is alive as poetry, but is reflective, philosophical, discursive. One thinks of Pope and Dryden and Crabbe, of Wordsworth too. Eliot's other major poetic achievement, the *Four Quartets,* belongs to precisely that school. Not that it lacks brilliance and concentration:

The dove descending breaks the air
With flame of incandescent terror
Of which the tongues declare
The one discharge from sin and error.
The only hope, or else despair
Lies in the choice of pyre or pyre—
To be redeemed from fire by fire.

Yet over-all, the *Four Quartets* explores another waste land, that of the spirit baffled in its struggle for integrity and meaning in face of the time that crumbles both away:

So here I am, in the middle way,
having had twenty years—
Twenty years largely wasted, the years
of *l'entre deux guerres*—
Trying to learn to use words, and
every attempt
Is a wholly new start, and a different
kind of failure
Because one has only learnt to get
the better of words
For the thing one no longer has to
say, or the way in which
One is no longer disposed to say it.
And so each venture
Is a new beginning, a raid on the
inarticulate
With shabby equipment always
deteriorating
In the general mess of imprecision
of feeling,
Undisciplined squads of emotion.

Time and language! They are not inappropriate meditations on the part of a poet in an era of space-time theory and highly critical linguistic philosophy, though few have cared to point this out.

There have been no major poems since the *Four Quartets,* and they are over twenty years old. Instead we have had the poetic dramas. *The Rock, Murder in the Cathedral, The Family Reunion* were prewar plays: *The Cocktail Party, The Confiden-*

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tial Clerk, and *The Elder Statesman* were postwar. They constitute a remarkable collection and they have yet properly to be assessed in terms of Eliot's poetry and of their contribution to British drama. I will only remark that they are not important for character or dramatic situations. One cannot really remember characters out of them—what they looked like or what was individual about them. Their role is to be voices in new moralities, or dramas of fate, vehicles for the reflective verse so characteristic of the later Eliot.

ALL IN ALL, this second burst of creative energy in Eliot is remarkable. It has been a prime mover in restoring the verse play to the English stage, and it conceals an ambition, which he confessed to me in an interview, to forge a loose, flexible, and accentual line instead of the heroic line of Shakespearean drama. He said: "It's very difficult to write blank verse which is both good poetry and sounds like people talking. Therefore I felt it was necessary to find a metric which was as far as possible from the iambic pentameter —that's what I hammered out for myself in *Family Reunion* and have used since. You asked if it was a personal prosody. It may be too personal a prosody. What I mean is, I should like—my ambition would have been—to start a prosody which would be an impersonal one, so to speak, useful to other dramatists, poetic dramatists, coming after me. . . . It may be that the norm of English versification is the same iambic pentameter, but it may be that the only way to refresh it from one time to another will be to get away from it in a curve which will gradually return, having freed itself from the stiffness of previous generations. It may mean that future verse dramatists will be able to return to the iambic pentameter as a fresh instrument. And if I have helped in bringing that about I shall be very happy, beyond the grave."

Only, I think, a man who was basically a critic saturated in all the richness of English literature could have posed himself such a task. If his poetry were to perish he would still be remembered as a critic who in scores of essays—not least those from his pen during his editorship of the *Criterion*—has laid down standards with a magisterial certainty. To some extent he has dominated English criticism with his concept of the *maturity* of a writer—a maturity that is a writer's power to organize his material and to impose himself upon his reader. This critical ability he has carried over into politics and philosophy in three notable Christian essays.

Nothing more? I have woken in the night sometimes thinking of this impenetrable and elusive genius who guards his privacy in all he writes. What I have found myself listening to, as a key to an understanding of him, is a certain sound. It is here in "The Hollow Men":

> We are the hollow men
> We are the stuffed men
> Leaning together
> Headpiece filled with straw. Alas!
> Our dried voices, when
> We whisper together
> Are quiet and meaningless
> As wind in dry grass
> As rat's feet over broken glass
> In a dry cellar

Do you hear the whisper, the sibilance? It is the most constant, the most evocative feature of Eliot's poetry:

> Midwinter spring is its own season
> Sempiternal though sodden towards sundown,
> Suspended in time, between pole and tropic,
> When the short day is brightest, with frost and fire . . .

> Webster was much possessed by death
> And saw the skull beneath the skin;
> And breastless creatures under ground
> Leaned backward with a lipless grin.

So many of his best lines have this sibilance. "A washed-out smallpox cracks her face." "His soul stretched across the skies." "Streets that follow like a tedious argument/Of insidious intent . . . " "What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow/Out of this stony rubbish? Son of Man/ You cannot say, or guess . . . "

One could go on tracking down "the dry stone no sound of water" which is to me the typical Eliot music. The sibilance evokes the withering hiss of the wind, the thirsty brush of dryness against dryness. Is it a key to the man and his poetry? Goodness knows; I certainly began to think it must be. I once collected thirty or forty examples and then gave it up, for it was so ubiquitous and all-compelling.

I LIKE to think that something of the dryness of the times he lived through is symbolized in that insistent whispering sound. They have been withering times of wars and revolutions and social changes not altogether congenial to a Christian patrician. He closed down the *Criterion* in despair at them. We once had a long discussion on "the cultureless culture"—my term, not his—in which we both found ourselves aghast and helpless over the trends of the times. It was not that he was against simple things or the popular elements of culture—no one who has read *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture* could imagine this—but rather (though in retrospect a little too despondently) we saw a culture arising which was not even popular, vulgar, and hearty, as the music hall he and I admired had been, but strictly cultureless, in the sense of slick commercial machines devised for entertainment on the one hand and vast, passive populations on the other over which this entertainment was poured like treacle. The recipients, we thought, made no contribution. Culturally they were a nullity. He remarked: "Now I think that the end of a purely materialistic civilization with all its technical achievements and its mass amusement is, if of course there's no actual destruction by explosives, simply boredom. A people without religion will in the end find that it has nothing to live for."

Well, it was a new sort of waste land we were discussing, on which after all he was an expert, and the ruinous wind from the dry sterile steppes of that world seemed to be blowing on us as we sat and talked in Russell Square. For both of us it looked like

> Internal darkness, deprivation
> And destitution of all property,
> Desiccation of the world of sense,
> Evacuation of the world of fancy,
> Inoperancy of the world of spirit . . .

One could well understand it if Tom Eliot was overlastingly haunted by the incessant whisper of drought in his ear, and if the dryness got into his poetry.

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But Not the Greatest Movie

ANDREW M. GREELEY

BACK in the early adolescence of Christianity there was a heresy called iconoclasm which was so convinced of the impossibility of conveying the image of the Lord in works of human hands that its followers went about smashing icons that attempted to portray Him. Leo the Isaurian and his bully boys have long since vanished from the scene, and in a way it is a shame; they would certainly have rallied to picket George Stevens's attempt to tell the life of Christ. Indeed, since the iconoclasts were scarcely given to nonviolence, they might even have burned some of the theatres showing the film.

The Greatest Story Ever Told is based on an idolatrous premise, namely that Max von Sydow has a Christlike face. He does not, of course, look like the shepherd youth of the catacombs nor much like the Christos Pantocrator of Byzantine mosaics (a *very* tough customer, by the way). But he does resemble the Christ of Renaissance painting: the thin ascetic face, the deep-set eyes, the mobile lips, the faintly puzzled yet determined expression. Nor was the risk of basing the whole production on one man's face such a poor one. Von Sydow, a member of Ingmar Bergman's Swedish stock company, is a first-rate performer; never mind that the viewer half wishes in the course of *The Greatest Story* that Death would come back to continue the chess game started in *The Seventh Seal*. Von Sydow is still the best thing in the whole movie.

Yet he is not good enough, even if he does bring to the role of Jesus a force and a flair that previous cinematic Messiahs have lacked. There are moments, especially when a quick smile flashes across his face, that carry almost overwhelming conviction. But they are all too few.

More often, von Sydow's faint Teutonic accent gets in the way; his conversations with his apostles sound like a German scoutmaster passing on maxims to his troop. His voice resonates too deeply, almost as though it had been reinforced on the sound track to give it a little added majesty. His diction is too perfect, his delivery too dynamic, his paradoxes too smooth. Von Sydow is a voice speaking to us from a Renaissance painting as retouched by Hollywood; he is never a man, but a spook with human attractiveness we take on faith but cannot see.

The scriptwriters did von Sydow no favors. Unlike the rest of the actors, he is required to speak almost entirely in scriptural phrases—and, of course, in the seventeenth-century translations. Further, these passages are pasted together from various parts of the sayings of Jesus (with an occasional quote from St. Paul thrown in) and frequently do not particularly fit the situation. Not only does this severely limit what von Sydow can do with his part; it also reduces the sayings of Jesus to a banality usually achieved only in sermons.

BUT HAVE FAITH; Hollywood can be relied upon not to put all its eggs in one idolatrous basket. First of all there is the scenery (in Ultra Panavision 70). Utah may not look much like Judea, but it is prettier. And the Jordan of George Stevens may not bear much similarity to the narrow and dirty stream of reality, but at least it looks the way the Jordan ought to look. Unfortunately, one's semiconscious associations with Utah landscapes present problems. Thus, Herod's raiders marching on Bethlehem unaccountably bring to mind Cochise and the Apaches closing in for an attack on a cavalry fort. And Lazarus is raised from the dead (to the accompaniment of a deafening "Hallelujah Chorus"—also used for the Resurrection) during a Western sunset usually reserved for the disappearance of the hero and his horse over the hill as the townsfolk wave a sad farewell.

But the real prize is the minor parts—the "cameos"—reserved for Hollywood personalities. Thus we have José Ferrer as Herod Junior (played like the emir in *Lawrence of Arabia,* but without the cough); Charlton Heston as a ranting, bellowing John the Baptist (caught as I was in the first row with Mr. Heston's stereophonic voice drumming in both ears, I became an early ally of Salome); Carroll Baker as Veronica (I'm hardly one to judge, but for all the current publicity, Miss Baker just doesn't seem to be the Wild and Wicked Woman type); Pat Boone (whom I never did identify); Sidney Poitier as Simon of Cyrene (great for integration—get

In Silver Spring

Now that storms are gone, and snow
has lost ground clear to the North Pole,
Vivid April shows that surely there
is no one thing this Spring, more green,
more airy, more clearly a yearly
Success, than the Washington, D. C., Arch-
Diocese Gates of Heaven Cemetery.

Even the wind, it seems, comes here
to breathe easier, to rest and replenish
its bag of birdsongs, aerial tricks,
flowerscents, & the thousand invisibles
it carries from the local residents.

Indeed, Fear must be foolish when Death
Springs a confidence so green, so singing
and airy, as the Washington, D. C., Arch-
Diocese Gates of Heaven Cemetery.

—FRANK POLITE

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

April Showers by Fernando Krahn

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it?); Angela Lansbury as a rather British Mrs. Pilate; and John Wayne (so help me) as the Roman centurion. His "Truly this man was the Son of God" is a dramatic triumph that will stay with you a long time.

For those who may not have the fortitude to stick it out until the end, I can state unequivocally that the movie ends like the book. The Good Guy wins. There is a substantial body of thought which contends that He will continue to do so. However, after seeing what has been done to His story, one suspects that He might make a lot more points if Leo the Isaurian & Co. were back in business. ««

Above the Clouds

ALBERT C. SCHMIDT

ONE HUNDRED YEARS AGO, Carlyle finished his life of Frederick the Great, and Edward Whymper climbed the Matterhorn. It is interesting to speculate what either of those insular stormers of continental heights—literary and literal—would say about the latest exploit of Walter Bonatti, veteran mountaineer and magazine photographer, who has just scaled the north face of the Matterhorn alone, in winter, while other photographers followed his arduous progress from airplanes.

Not that any Victorian moralist could have kept his sentiments, particularly on the subject of heroes, intact over the past half century; but with a modicum of consistency in style and principle he might have called this feat "one more eminent instance"—to paraphrase the exuberant Rector of Edinburgh—"of those wild struggles that elevate our notions of God, of Divine Splendour and Paradise, to heights more unattainable than ever before. Very curious! Yet there it stands, the Deed; and our reverence for the Man, and for the masonry of Nature that impelled his striving, rests clear and rational in our secret hearts."

Heroes there will always be. But if there is a moral in the Bonatti story, it is that the attitudes of heroes and their worshipers have undergone an epochal change. Whymper went on to the Andes; Bonatti has reportedly vowed to quit now, as far as any further excruciating firsts are concerned. For that resolve he may go down in history, certainly in the history of sports, as the herald of a new age. His choice of the Cervin, rather than of Elburz or Everest, for his final performance points up the lesson and symbolizes the closing of a circle. Bonatti, not Whymper, is the real hero of the Matterhorn, for the simple reason that he has decided to be sensible.

ALPINISM, like too many other sports in our day, has in its extreme forms become less of a sport than a mixture of occult science and theatrical bravado. Having now run its course, in full circle, back to the fascinating but hacked and hackneyed Swiss monolith that in good weather is climbed, via Whymper's route from Zermatt or over the harder way from Breuil, by dozens and more dozens, perhaps it will henceforth be appreciated as a human and accessible pastime instead of an immoderate addiction of specialists. If we are running out not only of new peaks but of north walls as well, men might begin to lower their sights, in a salutary sense, and start looking for "Divine Splendour" in more reasonable locations: on the lower peaks or at mid-mountain.

Several years ago, one of the Zermatt guides I know did not hesitate to put his foot down. He refused to take a party up the Matterhorn. "There are too many schoolteachers up there," he told us, "and they are always knocking down rocks on the heads of people in the rear. Let's do the Zinal Rothorn, or the Breithorn." And of course the view from any of the other four-thousand-meter peaks is just as good. Or better, offering the added attraction of seeing the Matterhorn at its own level—on our own terms, as it were.

There is a French handbook for climbers that lists all the pitfalls on the Mont Blanc and then goes on to give a disparaging description of the view from that eminence. We are informed that the prospect is dull *"par manque de premier plan."* What every good photographer knows, not every climber takes to heart: a big picture is enhanced by having something in the foreground. And that is precisely what is missing at twelve thousand feet. True, there is the thrill that goes with danger; fear can be fun; and a glacier seen from above, particularly in the moonlight, has a certain abstract beauty, like the gates of Hell or a bombed-out city. But mountains, like heroes, lose something in the close-up. Frederick and Napoleon come off better in Carlyle's wide-angle treatment than at the hands of more scrupulous, less adulatory writers. The Mont Blanc is at its best from a distance, say from the summit of Le Buet, or at sunrise from the slopes of Monte Emilio above Aosta; and the Alps of the Valais, including the Matterhorn, are never more sublime than in the perspectives from the Col du Torrent, the Meidenpass, and the Augstbordpass, three elevations that can be taken in on a week's hike from Sion to Zermatt without guides or any more cumbersome equipment than a couple of good maps and a change of socks.

Of the standard answers to the

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THE REPORTER Puzzle

Acrostickler No. 124

by HENRY ALLEN

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DIRECTIONS

1) Each crossword definition contains two clues. One is a conventional synonym; the other a pun, anagram, or play on words.
2) Letters from the acrostic should be transferred to the corresponding squares in the crossword, and vice versa.
3) The initial letters of the correct words in the acrostic will, when read down, spell out the name of a prominent person: the Acrostician.



A ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
4 186 166 118 26 150 36 128 95 Term improperly applied to the Yeoman Warders of the Tower of London.

B ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
124 46 214 108 52 170 Term for a small restaurant featuring oysters and clams (3,3).

C ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
168 164 12 50 90 176 182 42 Unhidden vice (4,4).

D ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
200 114 94 88 152 Beach at Normandy defended by the German 352nd Division.

E ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
74 6 62 48 188 178 132 104 220 40 112 157 Small African antelope.

F ___ ___ ___ ___
32 222 60 162 The market place in a Casbah.

G ___ ___ ___ ___
148 56 180 172 "Such as did bear_____in their kingdoms." Ecclesiasticus.

H ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
120 206 8 22 159 78 122 24 102 An article of apparel for the Acrostician (6,3).

I ___ ___ ___ ___
28 202 190 76 A company of women, for example.

J ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
216 34 98 69 58 208 136 64 A short novel by Theodor Storm frequently read in intermediate German class.

K ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
101 38 67 218 194 One of the rogues on the TV program of that name.

L ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
198 134 192 20 10 54 "Stiffen the sinews, _____up the blood." Shakespeare, "Henry V."

M ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
72 106 138 184 92 125 174 What a stronger horse will do with respect to others.

N ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
204 131 18 154 44 "God keeps a_____/ In Heaven, to hold our idols." Browning, "Sonnets. Futurity."

ACROSS

4. City the Acrostician represents in his activity.
32. A bit depressed, when it goes with the item borrowed (9,4).
61. Spied on what percolated (Scottish).
71. Blows which may be down at the heel.
81. I can take R.L.S. with ease when he ogles.
91. Find a poison in our air.
100. A penetrating way to go (4,2).
111. What Hamlet knew not is a bit more than a mess.
121. An illiterate question of the identity of R.L.S. may send us into coils.
130. The grain you find in such a weapon (3,3).
141. Eliot's cruelest month is par with 51.
151. Early heart.
161. Measure oak with 3.14 to find an animal.
182. Community pillars or stuffed shirts? (10,3).
214. I inter two when I make an addendum (5,4).

DOWN

5. Change men in the Christian era.
7. First part of Hemingway title to indicate possession (2,4).
9. What Hamlet was born to, north of the Marne.
11. Picture puzzle found in Erebus' environs.
18. Pot undersides or police seats? (6,7).
28. A cluster of fruit, sour according to Aesop (5,2,6).
46. Go back to what you were doing worse. You? Aye! (2,3,4).
60. Employ to fasten and toenail us (3,2,4).
81. Sails to a Polish commune (Germ. sp.).
83. An Arabian chief will find mere ere you do.
85. Anagram of 81 down becomes a fibre.
142. Pester when arranged ahead of time
144. Football team seems sick to start with.
155. It's a mistake to include this.
161. Open voter, it seems.

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question of why men climb mountains, the only one that strikes me as being ultimately valid is that they do it for the view. After all, there are other equally effective forms of self-torture, available for considerably less expense. We are sometimes told that men seek themselves up there, as though someone had implanted a large mirror instead of a cross at the top. There are good reasons to doubt that explanation, to suspect that for Whymper to stop climbing would have been the supreme self-conquest, just as for the teetotaler an occasional nip would testify to a sudden accrual of humility. We have returned, by a cruel and grueling circuit, to the starting point, to that skepticism which Carlyle might not have so deplored had he foreseen the philosophies of despair and desperation that were destined to take its place. Back to mid-mountain!

IT DOES appear that a *cours de moyenne montagne* is something mankind is going through now. Total war, total victory and surrender, total commitment to concepts, may be slowly, still agonizingly slowly to be sure, receding into that horizon of bloody sunsets which ends the Magic Mountain and which someday no man in his right mind will again depict as conceivably engendering love.

The twentieth-century hero is pursued, in his self-inflicted agony, by airborne hordes from the illustrated weeklies. Little wonder that he is ready to quit. To our interpolation of a larger meaning to his act, he might object that the vision of a new world of moderation is too delirious to preoccupy those of us who are unheroically content to contemplate the icy summits from a distance. But it is only down below that he himself has time and breath enough to wonder what his own dizziest visions may have meant. And maybe still farther down, in the valley, beyond the still equivocal crags and crevasses of the new skepticism, lies a love-giving hint of what Carlyle—a restless soul who perceived, however dimly, the perils of restlessness carried too far—called Christianism: "A nobler supremacy. . . . Time, through every meanest moment of it, resting on Eternity."

BOOKS

Of Dybbuks and Devilkins

PADDY CHAYEFSKY

SHORT FRIDAY, by Isaac Bashevis Singer. *Farrar, Straus. $4.95.*

This collection of sixteen short stories is the first Isaac Bashevis Singer book I've read. I'm afraid I'm not properly up on my Peretz, Mendele Mocher S'forim, or even the more current Yiddish writers, and I have at best only a waving acquaintance with Sholom Aleichem, so I can't help out much in terms of genre criticism. But it doesn't matter really, for you can't put Singer safely away as a Yiddish writer. Nor can he be put away as a contemporary writer on Jewish themes after the manner of Bellow, Malamud, even Babel, even Kafka, who wrote in their national language rather than Yiddish and about Jews in a Gentile world not especially concerned with Jews—a world, in fact, whose Gentiles are quite as forsaken by God as the Jews and quite as dispersed and despairing. Singer doesn't write about those things at all. There is simply no non-Jewish world in his stories, not even in the one set in Brooklyn and the one set in Miami Beach. With those two exceptions, Singer's stories all take place in tiny Jewish villages in what seems to be the Polish countryside and in what should be taken as the late nineteenth century, perhaps early twentieth, a complete world centered on shabby little synagogues and gaberdined, bearded rabbis, pious matrons with shaven heads, ritual slaughterers and ritual bathhouses, a world separated from space by thick forests out of which occasionally tramps a muddy-booted peasant to buy tallow candles and buckwheat. These silent peasants are the only non-Jews who ever appear, and then only momentarily.

If, however, you think these tales are reminiscent or parochial, you are mistaken. Singer's stories are very immediate, and the net result of his parochialism is the very opposite of parochial. To Singer, the whole world is nineteenth-century Jewish Poland and just about everyone is a nineteenth-century Polish Jew. It is a world untroubled by the political upheavals of the moment, the revolutions, wars, and scientific discoveries. All that remains to be written about here are the people and their absolutes. The consequence of this is a simplicity of style and a natural elementariness. There is none of the cumbersome complexity of modern writing, no obsession

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with the externals of relationships, no fumbling about for profundity beneath the civilized sigh. In Singer's world, life and death, God and hell, reality and illusion are on the same level of observation as taking a bath or marketing for Friday-night dinner.

SINGER'S characters are all quite ordinary in their imperfections. They rage with lust and tremble with doubt. They steal, murder, cheat, are swept up by infatuation, are crushed down by gossip. They are homosexual, impotent; they are adulterers, apostates. They are vain, arrogant, ambitious, calculating, greedy, violent, selfish, occasionally tender, occasionally remorseful. They are, in short, exactly the sort of characters you expect to find in any modern book. However, all Singer's people are passionate in their imperfections. They reach the depths, and they achieve the heights. Singer, in point of fact, portrays characters very few authors have dared to deal with. The reader suddenly becomes aware halfway through the stories that the shy little sextons and lusty butchers' wives, muddling along through the familiar deceits of life, have become figures of the most profound passions—martyrs, ascetics, and murderers propelled by emotions so primeval, so savage, that Singer must exploit the supernatural to make them comprehensible.

Singer's demons, warlocks, succubi, trolls, cacodemons, lamias, dybbuks, and devilkins are as vivid and alive as his human characters. The fact is, Singer's dark spirits aren't even supernatural; you are never asked to accept anything as implausible as that. They can all be explained by the realistic conditions of the stories. In "Under the Knife," the hero is a habitual drunk, and the story is told through the device of his shadowy imaginings. In "The Fast," the main character is predisposed to hallucinations by his weakened physical state. In "Esther Kreindel the Second," the heroine is an overwrought girl motivated to her extraordinary impersonation—if you're tiresome enough to prefer that to a reincarnation—by the misery of her life. In those stories where the characters are themselves spirits and transmigratory souls, the author makes it clear in the very first sentence that he is being fanciful, and even these stories never degenerate into allegory but rather serve the purpose of social satire; they are the weakest stories in the lot. In any event, nothing ever happens in Singer's stories that wouldn't have happened without demons or any sort of supernatural agency.

Singer's demons serve a far more attractive purpose than the purpose of allegory. For one thing, they allow him to write a spare and swift prose made voluptuous by the strange sounds and sensual colors one expects from demons. Without ever pausing in his precise realism, Singer brings in all the suggestions of fetid and feral things, murks and miasmas that have always been the province of the romantic and decadent. But they are neither romantic nor decadent in these stories, nor is the author a demonologist or a symbolist. Singer is a relentless realist, far closer to Chekhov than to Hawthorne—to whom he has been compared, mainly for his preoccupation with the supernatural. He reads much more like Maupassant than Poe. He does not provoke terror in the reader as the supernatural writer does, but he makes the reader understand the terror or perhaps aspiration that people described as possessed must feel.

AFTER "The Fast," one understands Saint Anthony in the desert or even Saint Joan as something more than a historical figure; one understands all ascetics or imbued persons who have seen an apparition or heard a voice. This is the seemingly amiable story of a wispy little man, never much of an eater, who, after he is abandoned by his wife and thus left untended and uncared for, pays even less attention to food, and even develops a pious distaste for it. Fasting becomes the proper order of things. But this turn to asceticism, so poignant and petty in this simple little man, who mortifies himself with backyard nettles and pebbles from the driveway, is unmotivated by any grand religiosity.

One Thursday night on the fifth day of a fast, as he lies stretched out on his bench, fitfully awake, fitfully dreaming, nightmare and reality follow in succeeding sentences:

"A huge frog opened its maw, ready to swallow him. The church-bell rang out. Itche Nokhum started up, trembling. Was there a fire or some other disaster? He waited for the bell to ring again. But there was only a distant, hollow echo. Itche Nokhum felt a need to urinate. He stood by the pail, but nothing came. He washed his hands, preparing to say the prayer proper for the occasion, but the urge returned. He felt a burning and a throbbing. His entrails contracted with cramps. A bitterness flooded his mouth, as on the verge of vomiting. 'Shall I take a drink of water?' Itche Nokhum asked himself. He went to the stool, where a pitcher stood, half-filled with water for ritual hand-washing, and turned it over reluctantly. One of his socks became wet. 'I'll not give in to him!' Itche Nokhum whispered. 'Show a dog a finger and he'll snap up the whole hand . . .'"

Then Itche Nokhum receives his first apparition, a succubus in the form of his ex-wife, Roise Genendel:

"Something began to stir in the dark by the door—a coiling wisp of vapor, airy and misty. . . . He tried to rise, but his legs were numb and heavy. The specter flowed toward him, dragging its tail of slime like a chick prematurely breaking out of the shell. 'The Primeval Substance!' something cried in Itche Nokhum. He recalled the Psalm: 'Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being unperfect.' He wanted to speak to the night-creature, but he was robbed of the power of speech. For a time he watched dumbly as she approached, half woman, half shapeless ooze, a monstrous fungus straining to break away from its root, a creature put together in haste. After a while, she began to melt away. Pieces dropped from her. The face dissolved, the hair scattered, the nose stretched out and became a snout, as in the manikins that people put on their window sills in winter to mock the frost. She spat out her tongue."

I INCLUDE these extracts only to show how remorselessly real is Singer's supernaturalism. In the end, you can take it any way you like. Itche Nokhum was just a lonely little man, distressed to the point of hallucination by his abnegation, whose ob-

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sessive longing for his ex-wife induced this apparition. Or he was Saint Anthony in the desert. In either case, Saint Anthony comes out of it a comprehensible figure. I've read all sorts of accounts of the early eremites; Singer writes of the ascetic experience better than any. If you want to understand the deformed anguish of a genuine witch, you will find it in the story "Cunegunde." Reincarnation is treated with the graceful perception of a Willa Cather in "Esther Kreindel the Second," and the total depravity of lust turned to blood lust is to be found in "Blood," as memorable a story as I can remember.

I find depressing the current compulsion to decide not just whether a writer writes well or not or even whether he's an artist or not, but whether his work is durable or not. I have no idea of Singer's permanence or his stature; I don't think there's anyone around who can yet tell. I only know that he is a bold and skillful writer, a superb storyteller, unafraid of frightening emotion and with the ear and eye of a poet. And, as with that rye bread whose name I've forgotten for the moment, you don't have to be Jewish to enjoy him.

The Trail to The Cow Palace

JOHN S. SALOMA III

THE AGONY OF THE G.O.P. 1964, by Robert D. Novak. *Macmillan. $6.95.*

In Robert Novak's view, all the leaders of Republican politics in the pre-convention drama spanning the months before San Francisco emerge pathetically ill prepared for the responsibilities of party and national leadership. The Republican Party after Eisenhower, Novak tells us, was leaderless—and ready for internal bloodletting. His narrative is a vivid account of that process.

The real heroes and winners of the Republican fight of 1964, in Novak's opinion, were the warriors of the Goldwater movement—"the foot troops who swarmed into precinct

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meetings from Seattle to Atlanta to take over the Republican Party." And, Novak concludes, "one of the great tragedies of our generation was to transform the political situation [of mid- and late 1963] in such a way that a peaceful Republican Party united under Barry Goldwater would be impossible."

THIS BOOK is written and should be read at two distinct levels—as a narrative of political events, an extended version of "Inside Report," the daily syndicated column that Novak writes with Rowland Evans; and as an analysis and interpretation of the internal dynamics of the Republican Party. As reporting the book is substantially a success; as analysis it fails.

Anyone who participated in the pre-convention campaigns of 1964 will find Novak's reporting a gripping re-creation of events that moved too fast for many of the participants to observe. More fascinating will be the accounts of communications and decision making at the staff levels. The internal problems of the Goldwater high command, from Clifton White's early organizational efforts through the take-over by the "nonpoliticians" William Baroody, Denison Kitchel, and Karl Hess, are treated in some detail. Novak reviews the strategy debate within the Rockefeller organization, especially the divergence between George Hinman and Judson Morhouse before the latter's resignation as New York State Republican chairman. But unfortunately, he stops here with a minimal discussion of the elaborate staff organization assembled for the Rockefeller campaign. Two of the most powerful advisers in the Goldwater and Rockefeller camps respectively, the "mysterious Bill Baroody" and Dr. William Ronan, receive only the briefest mention.

One of the most interesting behind-the-scenes reports is Novak's discussion of the Rockefeller-Goldwater breakfast meetings during the winter and early spring of 1963, attended only by the two principals and their key aides, Hinman and Victor Johnston, staff director of the Senate Republican Campaign Committee. Goldwater, at this point, apparently saw a natural alliance with Rockefeller against the Eisenhower-Nixon-Romney camp.

The major criticism of Novak's reporting is in his omissions. Novak tells us that White and his associates executed "one of the most remarkable clandestine operations in American political history," yet the identity of the men who conceived the Goldwater strategy "still cannot be revealed." Novak, apparently the recipient of deliberately leaked memoranda from the White operations, can tell only part of the story. It is significant that he has had to rely on published material that appeared in *Advance* magazine (an unintended leak) for some of his best descriptions of the inside of the Draft Goldwater organization. This is less a criticism of the book than it is a tribute to the security maintained by White.

THERE ARE more serious omissions. The book, focusing as it does on leading personalities, has virtually nothing to say about the part played by the national Republican organization in the events that culminated in San Francisco. The political role of the Republican National Committee and its staff is virtually ignored. "Operation Dixie," far from unimportant in the calculation of the Goldwater strategists, is only the most obvious omission. Nor does the Republican Party in either the House or Senate receive any consideration, although Novak notes that House members almost completely dominated the platform fight in San Francisco. The "tough, imperturbable" Melvin Laird, chairman of the platform committee, is called "not exactly an original Goldwater man (though not an anti-Goldwater man either)." The entire drafting of the platform, "the party's most conservative since 1936," is covered in a few paragraphs.

It is indeed unfortunate that Novak has not dug into these areas, especially when, according to informed observers, they contain some of the best-hidden skeletons of the campaign. Finally, Novak might have used some of his numerous Democratic sources to add a discussion of the Democratic Party attitude toward the Republican nomination. Democratic politicians, many of whom preferred Goldwater as their easiest potential opponent, are conspicuously absent in his discussion of nomination politics in 1964.

Novak's interpretation of Republican Party history as compared with his reporting of political events is open to more serious questioning. He goes to some length to suggest that the Republican Party has "Negrophobic" anti-civil-rights tendencies. This is by far the least convincing argument of the book. After tracing the "segregationist strain in Lincoln," Novak jumps to the vindictive Reconstruction program of the postwar radical Republicans "who detested Lincoln." Not again until Eisenhower's legislation of 1957 does the Republican Party pick up its "long discarded mantle as champions of civil rights." The argument ignores the record of Republican leaders in Congress throughout the 1940's and 1950's, as well as the extensive progress in civil rights under Republican governors and state legislatures in the North and West. It also ignores a strong base of Negro Republican support that survived the New Deal and was growing significantly during the 1950's.

CENTRAL to Novak's analysis is his thesis that the Republican Party has been bedeviled since the Bull Moose split of 1912 with a "perpetual and exhausting struggle," a "primordial battle" between conservatives and progressives. The Goldwater-Rockefeller (or Goldwater-Scranton) contest was just another re-enactment of William Howard Taft vs. Theodore Roosevelt. In the conventions since 1940, the conservatives had accepted the winning choice of the progressive wing and fought a united campaign against the Democrats. Now in 1964, when the Goldwater forces had triumphed over a divided, demoralized, exhausted progressive camp, why shouldn't the conservatives have their turn? Why, Novak seems to ask, didn't the Republican liberals allow Goldwater the chance to unify the party from the Right? "Considering the facts of life," Novak concludes, "it is incredible that the moderates did not throw down their arms after Cleveland and try to infiltrate—and moderate—the Goldwater camp," a plan that Governor Mark Hatfield of Oregon was proposing to his fellow Republican governors at least a month before

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San Francisco. The only true impact of the Scranton campaign, we are told, was to "force Goldwater deeper and deeper into his own coterie."

Novak's thesis of the disabling division between Republican Right and Left fails on two counts. First, the old conservative-progressive division was giving way to a new three-part division of militant-ideological conservative, traditional conservative (moderate-centrist), and progressive. Second, there is no evidence that the Goldwater forces really wanted to unify the party from the Right. The militant-conservative Goldwater movement showed more concern for purity than for unity in the usual "party" sense of the word. This movement was not just something new in American politics. It was actually transforming the ground rules of Republican Party warfare in revolutionary fashion. The movement was as intolerant of the Republican regulars, the professionals, the centrists, the old Robert Taft forces, as it was of the Eastern liberals. In fact, the Republican precinct organizations stormed by the Goldwater amateurs were the preserves of the traditional conservatives, not of the progressives. The power of the latter was rooted in 1964, as it was in 1940, in what Novak dismisses as "the faceless masses." But in 1964, when Scranton tried to mobilize popular Republican sentiment, he found a new kind of Republican activist in control of the party machinery. The old conservative-liberal divison is no longer relevant for interpreting Republican politics. Unfortunately, Novak gives us few insights into the origins of the militant-conservative movement or its relationships with the regular Republican organization.

Could Goldwater have been "moderated" by a policy of accommodation by the Rockefeller and Scranton forces? Novak himself makes several observations about Goldwater's support that suggest the contrary. The movement was bigger than the man. "Goldwater had not really started it all himself, and now he couldn't turn it off." Goldwater's extreme sensitivity to the charge that he was betraying the movement and his need for absolute loyalty from his subordinates further dimmed any prospects there might have been for accommodation. Novak describes the

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Goldwater take-over of several state organizations. Rather than "appease" the uncommitted, the Goldwater forces were "destroying" them. About four hundred of the Goldwater delegates, by his estimate, came straight out of the movement and were going to San Francisco for one purpose: to vote for Barry Goldwater. When one considers their disproportionate influence on the platform committee and other party bodies, it is wishful thinking to suppose that conciliation would have changed the outcome. The Goldwater forces were supremely confident of the nomination, as they had reason to be.

ONE can only speculate what the electoral verdict of the American people would have been if the Republican Party had produced no alternative to Goldwaterism at San Francisco. There was an air of unreality, Novak tells us, in Henry Cabot Lodge's assurance that "a Republican National Convention could never vote against a strong civil rights plank on a roll-call vote, particularly not on television." But what would the reaction of America have been if there had been *no* protest—if the Republican convention of 1964 had nominated Goldwater and endorsed his platform by acclamation?

There is an air of unreality in Novak's conclusion. The foot soldiers of the Goldwater movement stand as the heroes and the winners. Goldwater triumphs over his foes, who have "nothing to offer the people but themselves." Only he has had a "moral philosophy" capable of stirring his followers to the heights of enthusiasm. For a moment in the noisy, gaudy, gilded arena of the Cow Palace, the movement stands triumphant. Novak stops here.

Only the coming months would prove the irrelevance of their enthusiasm and the inadequacies of the leader in whom they had placed such blind trust. Having captured power and fulfilled their purpose, the disciplined ranks of San Francisco gave way to an undisciplined rabble. Having made the Republican Party over in their image for a day, they found themselves unable to cope with the realities of the world around them. For the victors as well as the vanquished, the agony had just begun.

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How Bad Was Reconstruction?

KENNETH S. LYNN

THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877, by Kenneth M. Stampp. *Knopf. $4.95.*

For the past seventy years and more, we have been living with the myth that the post-Civil War "Reconstruction" of the vanquished South was a "tragic era"—to use Claude G. Bowers's famous phrase. Some of the propounders of this view were Southerners seeking historical justification for their resentment of outside interference. But a striking number were Northerners. Whether they accepted the social-Darwinist outlook of the 1890's that government aid for private individuals, whatever their color, was immoral, or were influenced by Madison Grant's *The Passing of the Great Race* (1916) into believing that "the agitation over slavery was inimical to the Nordic race, because it thrust aside all national opposition to the intrusion of hordes of immigrants of inferior racial value," or were anti-New Dealers who viewed Franklin Roosevelt's attacks on states' rights with conservative alarm, they were united in the conviction that the radical Republicans of the 1870's had been a wicked crew.

IN THE 1930's, however, a countermyth arose that interpreted the Reconstruction era in a much kindlier light. Some of these new mythmakers were Marxists who glorified the attempts of various scalawag leaders to break up big plantations so that every man might have forty acres and a mule. Others were Negroes seeking vindication for the only governments in American history that had brought members of their race to the center of power. Still others were men of conscience who were as outraged by the South's cruelty to the Negro in the twentieth century as William Lloyd Garrison had been a hundred years before. As the fight for civil rights was intensified, the adherents of this countermyth grew in numbers and scholarly distinction.

Their arguments have been synthesized by Professor Kenneth M. Stampp of the University of California in *The Era of Reconstruction, 1865-1877,* a historical accomplishment that parallels what Bowers did for the earlier myth in *The Tragic Era.* If Bowers's book, published in 1929, was essentially an elegiac work —a tribute to a "Jeffersonian" America that received the death blow in the very year of its appearance— *The Era of Reconstruction* rides the strongest political wave of our time.

Professor Stampp readily admits the shabby aspects of the Reconstruction period—"the corruption was real, the failures obvious, the tragedy undeniable." And he is remarkably fair-minded in his assessment of even the most vulnerable aspects of Bowers's position. But, quietly yet convincingly, he demonstrates that the white people of the South were not treated with "unprecedented brutality" by the Reconstructionists, as legend would have it, but with amazing charity. Only a handful of Confederate civil officers were even arrested; none were ever brought to trial; and only Jefferson Davis (who was held for two years) remained in prison for more than a few months. As for the troops, they surrendered and went home—as Lee did—unmolested. By 1872, former Confederate leaders had become governors of states, members of Congress, and Cabinet advisers of Presidents. Stampp also makes a good case for the humanitarian ideals of the radicals—their interest in establishing schools for Negroes, in obtaining land for them, and in guaranteeing their political rights. In refreshing contrast to the economic cynicism of Charles A. Beard's generation, he argues reasonably and well that a concern for the Constitutional rights of corporations was by no means the only motive behind the agitation for the Fourteenth Amendment.

IT IS in its treatment of Lincoln that the Stampp countermyth becomes dubious. For those of the Bowers persuasion, Lincoln's assassination was the first act of a national disaster. The author of *The Era of Reconstruction* takes a different view. He points out that the Great Emancipator stated at one time or another that the slaves should be freed gradually, that colonization of the entire Negro population of the United States in either the West Indies or Africa was the ideal solution to our race problem, and until then the free Negro must resign himself to an inferior status in American society.

Stampp also emphasizes that Lincoln's interest in a peace without vengeance was not so much the product of that tragic compassion which Bowers had emphasized but the act of a consummately clever politician who wished to encourage the remnants of the old Whig Party in the South to reconstitute themselves as Republicans. By a generous treatment of the defeated rebels, Lincoln hoped to secure for his party a broader national base. Thus in a reversal of roles, the countermyth casts Lincoln as the "hardheaded realist," while Thaddeus Stevens & Co. become the "sentimental idealists."

Once this reversal has been accomplished, the book moves straight toward its concluding paragraph: "The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which could have been adopted only under the conditions of radical reconstruction, make the blunders of that era, tragic though they were, dwindle into insignificance. For if it was worth four years of civil war to save the Union, it was worth a few years of radical reconstruction to give the American Negro the ultimate promise of equal civil and political rights." Thus we are left with the judgment that only the radical course could have led to Constitutional guarantees of freedom. Like the Civil War, Reconstruction was an inevitable tragedy, but in the long run worthwhile.

The question Stampp never faces is, What if Lincoln had lived? It is not necessary to resort to the simplicities of Bowers to believe that a less radical formulation of Negro freedom might have permitted a genuine two-party system to come to life again in the South, and that in time this rivalry could have led to a competition for the allegiance of the freedman. In any event the use of Federal power, indispensable in our own time to the success of the civil-rights movement, was not the cure for social injustice a hundred years ago.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

NEW TWIST TO TELEPHONE SERVICE

The "twistor" wires shown above are actually only 31/10,000 of an inch in diameter—less than half the width of common sewing thread. Thousands of these precisely engineered strands, made by ingenious manufacturing techniques, form part of an amazing electronic memory. It is a key element in the new Electronic Switching System Western Electric is now building for Bell telephone company central offices. ☐ In just a few millionths of a second, these wires can "read" information stored in magnetic spots on metal sheets, and relay it to the System's electronic "brain." The information is stored in binary language (which uses only the digits "1" and "0"). ☐ Electronic switching, or "ESS," was developed by our teammate, Bell Laboratories. And, as frequently happens with such new communications developments, it presented Western Electric with difficult manufacturing problems. Example: to make twistor wires we had to find a way to wrap a strip of magnetic tape around the wire, making exactly 92 wraps per inch. ☐ But manufacturing new, unique communications products to incredibly high standards is a skill Western Electric has been perfecting for the 83 years we have been a member of the Bell System. That's one reason our other teammates, the 21 Bell telephone companies, can give you the most modern, and the most reliable communications service in the world at low cost.



Western Electric
Manufacturing & Supply Unit of the Bell System

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